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An old man and his son lived in an abandoned fortress on the side of a
hill. Their only possession of value was a horse.
One day, the horse ran away. The neighbors came by to offer sympathy.
'That's really bad!" they said. "How do you know?" asked the old man.
The next day, the horse returned, bringing with it several wild horses.
The old man and his son shut them all inside the gate. The neighbors
hurried over. 'That's really good!" they said. "How do you know?"
asked the old man.
The following day, the son tried riding one of the wild horses, fell off,
and broke his leg. The neighbors came around as soon as they heard the
news. 'hat's really bad!" they said. "How do you know?" asked the
old man.
The day after that, the army came through, forcing the local young men
into service to fight a faraway battle against the northern barbarians.
Many of them would never return. But the son couldn't go, because he'd
broken his leg.
-Benjamin Hoff, The Te of Piglet
I. INTRODUCTION
The above quotation from the "sequel" to The Tao of Pooh is a
shortened version of a famous tale attributed to the Taoist writer Liu An,
also reverently known as Huai Nan Tse. The story does not stand for the
proposition that it is impossible to judge any given situation as good or
bad.' Instead, the parable aptly symbolizes how difficult it can be to
determine whether a particular change in circumstances makes things better
or worse. The reason that such a normative inquiry can be complex is that
a particular change often produces a series of related changes that have
their own consequences. Thus, thoroughly evaluating a particular change
entails appraising not only that particular change, but also assessing an
entire sequence of related changes. This Article demonstrates that
1. A major theme of behavioral decision theory is that one's preference varies depending on
how it is elicited. See Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 AM. PSYCHOL. 364 (1995).
Even when individuals have fixed preference orderings, constructing a social preference ordering from
them can be impossible. See generally KENNETH JOSEPH ARROw, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL
VALUES (1951).
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derivative assets in a society can be like the wild horses in the above
parable.
This Article analyzes whether the introduction of new derivative
assets makes a society better or worse off. Because trading such non-
redundant derivatives produces new distributions of income across time
and over possible future contingencies, individuals can utilize such
financial instruments to hedge risks not possible before the introduction of
these assets. Thus, it may seem that new derivatives unambiguously
benefit society. In fact, introducing sufficiently many new derivatives
completes asset markets. Asset markets are complete if trading on them
can attain every possible payoff pattern of wealth across time and over
possible future contingencies. The first fundamental theorem of welfare
economics provides that if asset markets are complete and perfectly
competitive, the resulting equilibrium allocation of assets, commodities,
and risk is Pareto-efficient. Thus, new derivatives that complete asset
markets are unambiguously socially desirable. But, from the perspective of
most households, the empirical reality is that asset markets are severely
incomplete. Trading on incomplete asset markets cannot achieve some
distributions of money across time and over possible future contingencies.
The recognition that asset markets are incomplete has three far-
reaching implications for regulatory policy towards new derivatives. First,
for most societies, the addition of new derivatives to sufficiently
incomplete asset markets can make all households worse off. Second, for
most societies, a regulator can make all households better off by
reallocating existing asset portfolios without introducing any new assets.
Third, although government regulation can in principle improve the social
allocation of risk and the resulting levels of households' utilities, it may not
due to informational, decisional or political limitations on real world
regulators. These important normative implications of an incomplete asset
markets analysis inform the debate over how to regulate new derivatives.
First, because the current proliferation of new derivatives offers
households more choices, the popular economic and regulatory paradigm is
quite laissez-faire towards the introduction of new derivatives, if not even
biased in favor of them. But, because asset markets are incomplete for the
average person, new derivatives will typically have ambiguous normative
consequences on households. The reason for this conclusion is that with
incomplete asset markets, an increase in both hedging opportunities and
people utilizing such new opportunities affects the set of existing hedging
opportunities by changing existing asset and commodity prices. Those
price changes usually have indeterminate welfare implications for
2000]
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households. In other words, new derivatives that do not complete asset
markets can harm, benefit, or have no impact on consumers. More
precisely, for most economies, new derivatives can make everyone better
off, everyone worse off, or some people better off while other people worse
off. While lack of consumer demand may eliminate some useless or
harmful new derivatives, market forces will not necessarily discipline all
new derivatives because people who suffer the negative consequences may
not be among those who trade in derivatives. Thus, some new derivatives
may generate market failures in the form of externalities that regulators can
remedy by stepping in and more actively monitoring the introduction of
new derivatives.
Second, because asset markets are incomplete, market forces alone
cannot be counted on to arrive at a socially efficient allocation of risk that
normally occurs when asset markets are complete. In fact, with incomplete
asset markets, competitive equilibrium allocations are not only Pareto-
inefficient, but also usually constrained Pareto-inefficient. This result
means that for a typical economy, regulators have an opportunity to
improve societal welfare through market intervention. There are two ways
to accomplish such improvements. A benevolent regulator could utilize
taxes and subsidies on assets to reallocate portfolio holdings of existing
assets. Such a reallocation alters spot commodity market prices and in turn
causes a redistribution of income not attainable by trading in existing asset
markets alone. Alternatively, a benevolent regulator could utilize price
ceilings or floors to regulate spot commodity market prices.
Third, both of the above normative results about how a regulator can
improve upon the performance of incomplete asset markets require that
even a benevolent regulator be informed of individual households' tastes
and endowments. The reality of informational and political economy
constraints may substantially weaken the case for government intervention.
Thus, while regulatory improvements are possible in principle, at least for
now, because of informational, decisional or political limitations, they may
be difficult if not impossible to implement. Nonetheless, it is important to
realize that regulation may be undesirable because of informational or
political economy reasons and not because markets produce a socially
optimal allocation of risk bearing.
The above conclusions apply to new derivatives that have linear
payoffs, such as forwards, futures, or swaps. Recent financial research
extends the above conclusions to new derivatives that have non-linear
payoffs, such as European options. Lately, Over the Counter (OTC)
derivatives have generated increasing controversy and scrutiny. OTC
[Vol. 73:471
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derivatives evolved from a standing start fifteen years ago to an underlying
or notional value of $80 trillion at the start of 1999 as estimated by the
Bank for International Settlements. OTC derivative markets are not only
large and expanding, but are also global. Unlike exchange traded
derivatives, OTC derivative markets do not occur at fixed locations and
thus are not regulated by any single government agency of any particular
country. In November 1999, the President's Working Group on Financial
Markets recommended changing the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) to
promote innovation in OTC derivative markets by providing certainty
regarding the legality of OTC derivatives. The above theoretical findings
have implications for the approval of new OTC derivatives and retail
consumer derivative products.
This Article examines the introduction of derivative products from a
normative perspective. A vast literature already exists about new
derivatives and the related field of financial engineering from a positive,
that is, descriptive perspective.2 Several legal symposia deal with the
regulation of derivatives. 3  There are up-to-date books concerning
derivatives for legal practitioners,4 non-specialist managers, 5 regulators and
traders and bankers,6 second year MBAs who are specializing in risk
management,7 and business executives and practicing lawyers. 8 There is
even a unique state-of-the-art, multimedia introduction to derivatives.
9
Finally, a growing body of theoretical and empirical research in financial
economics focuses on the process of asset innovation and the diffusion of
new financial products.
10
2. See, e.g., JULIAN WALMSLEY, NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (2d ed. 1998) (providing a
comparative, systematic and comprehensive guide to the latest financial tools and techniques).
3. See, e.g., Symposium, Derivatives & Risk Management Symposium on Stability in World
Financial Markets, 4 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L.F. 1 (1999); Symposium, Derivative Securities, 21
J. CORP. L. 1 (1995).
4. See, e.g., KENNETH M. RAISLER& ALISON M. GREGORY, SWAPS & OTHER DERIVATIVES IN
1999 (PLI Corp. Law and Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-1 147, 1999).
5. See, e.g., PHILIP McBRIDE JOHNSON, DERIVATIVES: A MANAGER'S GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S
MOST POWERFUL FINANCIAL INSTRUmENTS (1999).
6. See, e.g., ALFRED STEINHERR, DERIVATIVES: THE WILD BEAST OFFINANCE (1998).
7. See, e.g., DON M. CHANCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES (4th ed. 1998).
8. See, e.g., ROBERT M. MCLAUGHLIN, OTC DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS: A GUIDE TO BUSINESS
AND LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND DOCUMENTATION (1999).
9. See, e.g., MARK RUBINSTEIN, DERIVATIVES: A POWERPLUS PICTURE BOOK: VOLUME I
FUTURES, OPTIONS AND DYNAMIC STRATEGIES (1998). See the book's related website <http://www.in-
the-money.com> (last modified Dec. 12, 1999), for a detailed description of the book and its novel
features.
10. See generally PHILIP MOLYNEUX & NIDAL SHAMROUKH, FINANCIAL INNOVATION (1999)
(providing a detailed review of this literature).
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A pioneer in financial engineering and the pricing of derivatives once
noted that "[t]here are so many ways to use derivatives that I'm almost
surprised when someone doesn't use them. Producers and consumers,
investors and issuers, hedgers and speculators, governments and financial
institutions: almost everyone can use them."' 1 This Article applies recent
research in financial economic theory to examine the impact of new
derivatives not so much on the profitability of investment banks and
corporations whose stocks and bonds are traded on Wall Street, but instead
on the economic well-being of a typical household living on Main Street.
To relate sophisticated financial innovations like derivatives to average
families, this Article focuses on individuals trading in derivatives either
directly or indirectly via such financial intermediaries as their mutual funds
or pension funds. Another way that individuals can indirectly invest in
derivatives is by being shareholders of corporations that use derivatives to
hedge financial risks. Even diversified shareholders derive substantial
benefits from corporate hedging utilizing derivatives. 2
New assets create and provide new opportunities for sharing risks and
smoothing out fluctuations in expenses and income over time. Broadly
conceived, the phrase "financial innovation" includes not only the
introduction of new assets, but also the introduction of new financial
products that are not assets. 13 The phrase "asset innovation" encompasses
a plethora of new assets including corporate bonds, stocks, convertibles,
hybrids, floating-rate debt, floating-rate preferred stock, zero-coupon
bonds, primes, scores, poison pills, dual-currency bonds, transferable loan
11. Fischer Black, Foreword: The Many Faces of Derivatives to THE HANDBOOK OF EQUITY
DERIVATIVES, at ix (Jack Clark Francis, William W. Toy & J. Gregg Whittaker eds., 2000).
12. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth:
Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039 (demonstrating this conclusion by
thorough empirical and theoretical analyses).
13. See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK SHARING 5
(1994) (proposing abroad conception of financial innovation). Much of this introduction draws heavily
on their wonderful description of the history and practice of asset innovation. This Article uses the
narrower term "asset innovation" rather than the broader term "financial innovation" because financial
innovation includes innovation in many other forms besides the introduction of new assets. Examples
of non-asset financial innovation are real-time financial news services, electronic trading opportunities,
on-line personalized financial advice services and modem investment planning software. A specific
example of an on-line personalized financial advice service is Net-based Financial Engines, Inc. that
offers individual households user-friendly but customized and sophisticated advice regarding their
401(k) plans based on the Nobel Prize-winning economist William F. Sharpe's asset allocation model.
See Financial Engines (visited February 4, 2000) <http://www.financialengines.coml>. A specific
example of analytically sophisticated retirement planning software is Economic Security Planning,
Inc.'s ESPlanner that implements Nobel Prize-winning economist Franco Modigliani's life cycle
consumption smoothing model. See MIT Press, ESPlanner (visited February 4, 2000)
<http://nitpress.mit.edu/esplanner/info.html>.
[Vol. 73:471
NEW FINANCIALLY ENGINEERED DERIVATIVES
instruments, mortgage and asset-backed securities, structured notes, and
index-linked bonds. 14 The term "financial engineering" refers to creating
tailor-made solutions to highly complex problems in managing the
financial risk of price fluctuations. 15  Indeed, financial engineering has
been defined as "the development and the creative application of financial
technology to solve problems in finance and to exploit financial
opportunities." 16 Financial engineers often synthetically create new
financial products that are known as exotic (as opposed to so-called plain
vanilla) derivatives that do not exist in the marketplace to help end-users
hedge against or profit from financial volatility. 17 The financial economic
theory underlying financial engineering is that every asset can be replicated
by a suitably chosen portfolio of options written on some index of assets. 18
Financial engineers derive their name from the fact that modem derivatives
pricing and valuation models utilize the same type of advanced
mathematics that is also used to describe the random, irregular motion of
small particles in gases or liquids, namely stochastic differential
equations. 19 Of course, the phrase "financial engineer" suggests another
profession, that of genetic engineer. Indeed, one legal scholar invoked the
vision of derivatives inhabiting a financial Jurassic Park with the
implication that financial engineers have the potential to create financial
products that could end up destroying civilization.20 The analogy is not
quite apposite for the reason that some forms of life exist in nature or
existed in nature (as in the case of dinosaurs), while no assets exist in
nature because all assets are human creations. In addition, analogizing
financial engineering to genetic engineering raises visceral fears and
14. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 13, at 16 tbl.2.1, 17-31 (listing and describing examples of
asset innovation).
15. See ROBERT W. KOLB, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 10 (2d ed. 1996) (defining financial
engineering).
16. InternationalAssociation of Financial Engineers, 1 1. FIN. ENGINEERING 1 (1992).
17. See William F. Sharpe, Nuclear Financial Economics, in RISK MANAGEMENT: PROBLEMS
AND SOLUTIONS 17, 34 (William H. Beaver & George Parker eds., 1995) (describing what financial
engineers do).
18. See Fred D. Arditti & John Kose, Spanning the State Space with Options, 15 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (1980) (proving this technical result).
19. See, e.g., YUE-KUEN KWOK, MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIvES 25
(1998) (describing Brownian motion and the random walk model); BERNT OKSENDAL, STOCHASTIC
DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION WITH APPLCATIONS 120-88 (5th ed. 1998) (describing
various applications).
20. See Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of
the Corporate Objective, 21 J. CORP. L. 3, 10-11 (1995).
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images from popular culture about humans tampering with a natural
order.
21
There is a strong temptation to conclude from the large number of
recent derivative innovations and the increased utilization of financial
engineering that we live in a world with complete asset markets. Asset
markets are complete if trading on asset markets can generate any
conceivable pattern of payoffs over time and under alternative future
scenarios. Households can insure against all financial risks by trading on
complete asset markets. Indeed, under certain technical conditions,
sufficiently frequent trading of a few judiciously chosen assets can
substitute for assets that do not actually exist in the marketplace.22 But,
upon even a moment's reflection on the universe of Main Street instead of
the world of Wall Street, it becomes clear that a typical household faces
asset markets that are woefully incomplete. An average family can do little
to insure against reversals in their employers' fortunes,23 real estate
prices,24 national income levels,25 employer provided health insurance
coverages,26 and inflation.27 The same is true even of nonfinancial
businesses that remain uninsured with respect to macroeconomic and
sector-specific shocks.
28
The rate new derivatives are introduced and the scope of financial
engineering have dramatically exploded recently in response to demands by
sophisticated parties on Wall Street to hedge against or profit from capital
market risks.29 Modem capital markets increasingly experience short-term
21. See Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 639, 656-
57 (1999) (providing examples from popular culture of images that genetic engineering is dangerous,
ranging from movies such as Blade Runner to The Matrix).
22. See Darrell Duffle & Chi-Fu Huang, Implementing Arrow-Debreu Equilibria by Continuous
Trading of Few Long-Lived Securities, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1337 (1985) (proving this technical result).
23. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 13, at 3 (describing lack of much insurance against
employer's financial health).
24. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING
SOCIETY's LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS 78 (1993) (describing lack of much insurance against adverse
fluctuations in housing prices).
25. See id. at 52 (describing lack of much insurance against adverse changes in national income).
26. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 13, at 4 (describing lack of much insurance against loss of
employer health coverage).
27. See SHILLER, supra note 24, at 94 (describing lack of much insurance against rising
inflation).
28. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 13, at 4 (describing lack of much insurance against
macroeconomic and industry-specific shocks).
29. Another driving impetus for asset innovation is tax arbitrage. See James C. Van Home, Of
Financial Innovation and Excesses, 32 J. FIN. 621, 628 (1985) (describing how Adjustable Rate
Preferred Stocks (ARPS) and Convertible Adjustable Preferred Stocks (CAPS) allowed corporate
investors to take advantage of an 85% tax exemption for dividend income). See also, e.g., Lawrence
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volatility and global interconnections.30 Capital markets provide vital
intermediaries between the saving decisions of households and the
investment decisions of the private and public sectors. We live in the dawn
of the age of digital capitalism where capital flows almost instantaneously
and respects no international or jurisdictional boundaries. 31 Advances in
information computing technologies and telecommunications have
increased the speed of derivatives innovation and the range of financial
engineering because those advances permit faster and more accurate inputs
and outputs to derivatives pricing and valuation models than before. Many
observers are concerned that global asset markets and the financial services
industry are more fragile and linked than ever before due to fundamental
changes in communications and computing technologies. 32  In such an
interdependent financial environment, financial engineering creates new
derivatives that are powerful tools for effectively addressing the
increasingly sophisticated and changing demands of capital market
participants to manage the volatility of capital market prices.
New derivatives and financial engineering can improve the allocation
of risks in society by allowing people to shift risks by getting rid of
unwanted risks and taking on desired risks. "At this point, it might be
helpful to ask more specifically what is the social usefulness of markets for
shifting risks? 33 An answer is that "[t]he possibility of shifting risks, of
insurance in the broadest sense, permits individuals to engage in risky
activities which they would not otherwise undertake" and undertaking
Fisher, Ivan E. Brick & Francis K.W. Ng, Tax Incentives and Financial Innovation: The Case of Zero-
Coupon Bonds and Other Deep-Discount Corporate Bonds, 18 FIN. REV. 292 (1983) (describing the tax
advantage to corporations of issuing Original-Issue-Discount (OLD) bonds until passage of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982). See generally MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A.
WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH (1992); Michael S. Knoll,
Financial Innovation, Tax Arbitrage, and Retrospective Taxation: The Problem with Passive
Government Lending, 52 TAX L. REV. 199 (1997); Reed H. Shuldiner, A General Approach to the
Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 243 (1992); Jeff Stmad, Taxing New Financial
Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REv. 569 (1994).
30. See Alan Greenspan, The Globalization of Finance, 17 CATO J. 243, 244, 247 (1998)
(discussing interdependencies among financial markets and the spread of contagion effects across
national boundaries).
31. ELINOR HARRIS SOLOMON, VIRTUAL MONEY: UNDERSTANDING THE POWER AND RISKS OF
MONEY'S HIGH-SPEED JOURNEY INTO ELECTRONIC SPACE 151, 159-65 (1997) (describing such a
world).
32. But see David E. Van Zandt, The Regulatory and Institutional Conditions for an
International Securities Market, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 47,49-54 (1991) (proposing a "test of one price" to
determine whether securities markets are truly global and utilizing that test to argue they are not yet).
33. Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Insurance, Risk, and Resource Allocation, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY
OF RISK-BEARING 134, 137 (1971).
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those risky projects means that "society will be better off by the ingreased
production."
34
In addition, introducing derivatives to different groups of individuals
democratizes access to financial and capital markets. Although individuals
in the United States and the western European countries enjoy high average
standards of living, the distribution of income varies substantially across
their populations and over time. People can enjoy higher standards of
living by pursuing opportunities to reallocate or share risk. Historically,
there have been many different methods for smoothing incomes over time
and sharing financial risks. In ancient China, individuals received support
in bad times from their families and in their old age from their children.
Rotating credit associations are another institution for the sharing of risks
in developing countries or among immigrants to developed countries.
Residents in the United States and England can manage their financial risks
by trading from a diverse menu of assets that includes a plethora of mutual
funds. Residents in other countries primarily manage their financial risks
through various financial intermediaries, such as banks. Countries also
differ in the scope of safety net or welfare programs their governments
provide to cope with financial risks. In the United States, while people
have primary responsibility for and freedom in their decisions about how to
manage their financial risks, federal and state governments engage in such
risk-sharing programs as unemployment insurance, Medicare, Medicaid,
and Social Security. There has been much recent discussion about how to
reform and/or privatize our Social Security program.35 Much of the current
debate about proposed Social Security program reforms hinges on the
question of how to share macroeconomic financial risks across generations
in a socially optimal fashion.
The preceding discussion suggests that the allocation of risk in a
society is just as important, if not more, than the more familiar allocation of
commodities and services in an economy. A less than socially optimal
allocation of risk is unfortunate because it means that society could
improve the welfare of its members by reallocating the distribution of risks
and risk bearing across society. An inefficient allocation of risk is also
unnecessary if a government regulator can redistribute the distribution of
risks and risk bearing across the population. The allocation of risk and risk
bearing directly affect not only the income and welfare of households, but
34. Id. at 137-38.
35. See, e.g., THOMAS E. MACURDY & JOHN B. SHOvEN, ASSET ALLOCATION AND RISK
ALLOCATION: CAN SOCIAL SECURITY IMPROVE ITS FUTURE SOLVENCY PROBLEM BY INVESTING IN
PRIVATE SECURITIES? (National Bureau Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 7015, 1999).
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also indirectly affect consumer income and welfare via its effect on
corporate profits, research and development, and real investments.
To date, the most direct impacts of new derivatives and financial
engineering have been on the commercial financial sector and the
community of sophisticated and wealthy investors. But new derivatives
and financial engineering have also created many spillovers or trickle-down
effects. Even the average person in the United States today has access to a
dizzying array of assets and financial services that were not available until
only recently. Today's investors can select from a surfeit of retail choices
including commodity futures, currency options, and mutual or pension
funds. But, despite all of the possible financial instruments that households
can utilize to manage financial risk, the average family cannot hedge or
diversify against every single conceivable financial risk. In other words,
people face incomplete asset markets.
A novel feature of this Article is that it explains and builds on the
insights of recent advances in theoretical financial economics that focus on
incomplete asset markets. In such environments, the assets that are
unavailable severely constrain the well-being of households. If some asset
markets are missing, the remaining asset markets cannot make up for them.
In other words, a society with incomplete asset markets cannot attain a
socially efficient allocation of risk that can be attained with complete asset
markets. This is not a surprising result because some risk allocations are
unattainable with incomplete asset markets. But, what might be a
surprising result is that usually new derivatives have indeterminate welfare
consequences for households. In other words, new derivatives can make all
households worse off or better off, or some households worse off and
others better off. Perhaps even more surprising is the result that an
incomplete asset market economy will typically possess competitive
equilibria that can be improved upon by a benevolent regulator reallocating
existing assets without completing asset markets.
The rest of this Article is organized as follows. Part II offers a very
brief overview of the financial, legal and regulatory environment facing
new derivatives in the United States. Part I describes the general
equilibrium theory of incomplete asset markets. Part llI.A explains why
new derivatives will typically have ambiguous normative implications.
Part I.B explains why incomplete asset market equilibrium allocations are
not only inefficient, but also typically constrained inefficient. Part IV
considers the implications of the results in Part III for regulatory approval
of both new OTC derivatives and retail consumer derivative products. Part
V discusses other regulatory proposals for government intervention in
2000]
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terms of reallocating assets or regulating underlying spot market prices.
Part VI concludes with final thoughts about how new derivatives affect
households. The Appendix contains the simplest numerical example of a
regulator improving the allocation of risk in a society with incomplete asset
markets by reallocating an existing derivative in that economy without
completing asset markets.
II. THE FINANCIAL AND U.S. LEGAL/REGULATORY
LANDSCAPE OF DERIVATIVES
Asset innovation and financial engineering often involve creating
derivatives that do not exist in the marketplace and/or using derivatives that
do exist in the marketplace to create other assets. This Part thus presents a
very brief overview of the financial landscape and the U.S. legal and
regulatory environment that innovators of derivatives face. Derivatives
have received a great deal of negative coverage in the media.36 The Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund reportedly lost $4.4 billion
during August and September of 1998 from trading in derivatives. 37 Many
of the popular accounts in the financial press about LTCM's troubles
implied that irresponsible exotic speculation using derivatives by a breed of
young former finance professors caused these losses.38 Many people,
including legal academics, regulators, and taxpayers, have an inaccurate
and misleading impression of derivatives without really knowing much
about, or even really beginning to understand them. The controversy over
derivatives would benefit from "unbundling and identifying the risks
associated with derivative financial instruments, and then asking if
regulation, in particular investor protection regulation, is being
appropriately directed at those risks."39  Since then, exactly such an
36. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: Derivatives (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 5, 1995) (15 minute
segment reporting on derivatives losses). But see G. Bruce Knecht, TV: Derivatives on '60 Minutes',
WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at A18 (providing a justifiably negative review of the program). See also
NOVA: Trillion Dollar Bet (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 8, 2000) (one hour program describing the
discovery of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula and its use in derivatives trading) and the related
website (visited February 25, 2000)
<http://www.pbs.orgwgblnovaltranscriptsL/2704stockmarket.htnl> (providing a transcript of the
program).
37. See Michael Lewis, How the Egghead Cracked, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999, § 6 (Magazine),
at 24 (reporting on the failure of LTCM).
38. See id. at 24; Steven Lpin, How a Big Hedge Fund Marketed Its Expertise and Shrouded Its
Risks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1998, at Al (reporting on LTCM and speculating on the causes for its
losses).
39. Joanna Gray & Elspeth Fennell, Derivative Financial Instruments, Risk Regulation and
Investor Protection, in LAW AND UNCERTAINTY: RisKs AND LEGAL PROCESSES 155 (Robert Baldwin
ed., 1997).
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unbundling of the various risks that derivatives pose and the regulatory
recommendations that follow from such a risk-based perspective have
appeared in the legal academic literature n°
So, "[w]hat are derivatives anyway, and why are people saying such
terrible things about them?" 41  Those readers who are familiar with
derivatives may wish to skip to Part IT of the Article. Those readers who
are unfamiliar with derivatives may wish to also consult additional
overviews of derivatives.42 A derivative can be formally defined as a
financial contract with a payoff value on its expiration date, denoted by T,
that is derived from the market price at T of an underlying cash
instrument. 43  There are five major categories of underlying cash
instruments: stocks, currencies, interest rates, indices and commodities.
44
But there are only two canonical types of derivatives: forwards and options.
A forward is a contract that obligates its holder to buy or sell an underlying
asset at a preset price, known as the forward price, on a preset date.45 A
specific example is a forward contract to buy a puppy for $400 to be born
by a highly prized St. Bernard in six weeks.46 An option is a contract that
provides its holder with the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an
underlying asset at a preset price, known as the strike or exercise price, on
or before a preset date.47 A specific example is an option contract to buy
100 shares of Time-Warner stock for $130 per share in two months.
All other derivatives are either variations or combinations of these
fundamental derivatives.48 Futures, for example, are forwards which are
traded on organized exchanges with standardized contractual terms and
exchange-guaranteed contractual performance. A swap is defined to be the
simultaneous exchange of cash flows derived from an underlying asset.
Any swap is thus a series of forwards.49 A fixed interest rate home
40. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New Financial Bingo": A Risk-Based Approach
to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 17-63 (1997).
41. Lee Burton, Understanding the Complex World of Derivatives, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1994,
at Cl (asking that and related questions and providing answers).
42. See generally Krawiec, supra note 40, at 6-14 (presenting a lucid and masterful synopsis of
derivatives emphasizing the dichotomy between forward-based and option-based derivatives).
43. See JONATHAN E. INGERSOLL, JR., THEORY OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING 50 (1987)
(providing a formal definition of a derivative).
44. See SALICH N. NEFTCI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MATHEMATICS OF FINANCIAL
DERiVATIVES 2-3 (1996) (providing a list of underlying instruments).
45. See id. at 5 (defining a forward contract).
46. This example is taken from ROBERT w. KOLB, FuTURES, OPTIONS, & SWAPS 2 (2d ed.
1997).
47. See NEFrCI, supra note 44, at 7.
48. See id. at 5.
49. See id. at 9.
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mortgage without penalty for early prepayment, for example, provides a
homeowner with an option to refinance at lower mortgage rates. Such
prepayment options motivated the development of collateralized mortgage
obligations (CMOs) that are assets based on the pooling of mortgages.
50
Forwards and options are the basic building blocks of not only other
derivatives, but also all assets because any asset-not just a derivative-
can be synthesized by constructing a portfolio of the appropriate forwards
and options.
By their very definition, derivatives are financial instruments whose
payoffs depend on prices of underlying commodities or cash instruments.
Thus, by trading in derivatives, economic agents can manage the risk of
underlying market price volatility by shifting all or part of that risk to
counter-parties who are more willing to assume or bear that risk.51 Of
course, economic agents may also trade in derivatives to speculate on the
risk of underlying market price volatility by shifting all or part of that risk
from counter-parties who are less willing to assume or bear that risk. This
traditional account of the desirable role that derivatives can play in our
financial system emphasizes their use in hedging underlying price risk.52
While primitive assets such as bonds and stocks help to allocate
capital in an economy, derivatives help to allocate the risk from primitive
asset price volatility. Derivatives "benefit the entire financial system by
'completing' markets (offering investors and traders risk and return
patterns that previously were either unavailable or too costly). '53 The
debate over how to regulate derivatives requires a comparison of the
important economic benefits that derivatives provide society with the real
and not imagined costs they impose on society. 54 It is therefore imperative
that policymakers have an "understanding of the costs and benefits
associated with altering the pattern and practices of risk allocation in the
economy. The implications of actions to regulate workings of the
50. See, e.g., DAVID G. LUENBERGER, INVESTMENT SCIENCE 402-06 (1998) (providing more
details about CMOs).
51. See George Parker, Dimensions of Risk Management: Definition and Implications for
Financial Services, in RISK MANAGEMENT.' PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 1, 13 (William H. Beaver &
George Parker eds., 1995) (explaining how derivatives reallocate risk).
52. See CHARLES W. SMITHSON & CLIFFORD W. SMITH, JR., MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK: A
GUIDE TO DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, AND VALUE MAXIMI7ATION 65 (1995)
(explaining how derivatives hedge against unwanted risk).
53. Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L.
211,213 (1997).
54. See Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55
MD. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) (explaining that derivatives "serve important economic functions that cannot
be overemphasized").
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derivatives markets could be far-reaching."5 5  This Article highlights a
bona fide pecuniary externality cost of introducing new derivatives that is
currently overlooked in legal and regulatory assessments of derivative
innovations.
5 6
In most countries, how derivatives are regulated depends on whether
they are traded on or off exchanges. Derivatives traded on exchanges are
regulated by government agencies. In the U.S., distinct federal agencies
have jurisdiction over different kinds of derivatives with the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission (CFI7C) regulating futures contracts and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulating securities and
exchange-traded options. Derivatives traded off exchanges are also known
as OTC derivatives. There are other differences between derivatives traded
on exchanges and OTC derivatives besides where they are traded.57 The
acronym OTC standing for the phrase "Over the Counter" might suggest
"standardized contracts sold like aspirins [sic] over a store counter."58 But,
in fact, the phrase "means exactly the opposite: specially tailored, bespoke
derivatives cut to suit each customer. It is Saville Row to the futures
exchanges' Oxford Street.' 59 In other words, OTC derivatives are designer
assets that are custom-made or financially engineered to meet-at least in
principle-clients' specific requirements. OTC derivatives are not
regulated or governed by any one particular government agency. But, as
contracts, OTC derivatives are still governed by standard contract law
principles. In addition, the International Swap and Derivatives Association
(ISDA) is a trade association that oversees the swaps market by
standardizing swap contractual terms.60 Thus, ISDA lowers the transaction
costs of initiating swaps, facilitates the swap transfer process, and permits a
swap dealer to enter a position despite no immediate party being on the
other side of the deal. The global markets for OTC derivatives evolved
from a standing start fifteen years ago with total contract or notional value
55. Scott P. Mason, The Allocation of Risk, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A FUNCTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 153, 192 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Global Fm. Sys. Project ed., 1995).
56. See infra Part Il.A.
57. See Mark A. Zurack, Applications of OTC Options and Other Structured Products, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EQUITY DERIVATIVES, supra note 11, at 281,282 tbl.13.1.
58. RICHARD THOMSON, APOCALYPSE ROULETTE: THE LETHAL WORLD OF DERIVATIVES 81
(1998).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Alison M. Gregory, Selected Issues: ISDA Master Agreement, in SWAPs AND
OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1999, supra note 4, at 35.
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increasing to $7 trillion in 1989 and to $56 trillion in 1995.61 The Bank for
International Settlements estimated notional value was $80 trillion at the
start of 1999.62 But, it is worth repeating that the value at risk for OTC
derivatives is a mere fraction of their principal or notional value (only
4.6%) because the principal or notional amount does not usually change
hands.
63
The LTCM episode described in the introduction of this Part was only
the latest in a series of well-publicized huge losses involving derivatives.
64
These losses total over $12 billion and seem to suggest that derivatives are
inherently dangerous and/or too complex for at least some of their end-
users to understand them and the various risks they involve. But the mere
fact that some relatively wealthy and sophisticated parties have lost vast
sums of money from trading in derivatives is not by itself a cause for social
concern. This is because derivative transactions are what are called zero-
sum games. In other words, the sum of the payoffs to a buyer and a seller
in any derivatives trade is zero. Thus, any loss that is suffered by one side
of a trade involving a derivative is exactly offset by a corresponding gain
for the other side. This basic accounting fact is usually not mentioned in
media and popular press accounts of losses from derivatives trading. What
might be a cause for social concern is the alleged possibility that huge
losses from trading in derivative assets could trigger a domino effect of
bank collapses leading to systemic failure of global capital markets. 65 Such
a rationale lies behind proposals for more prudential margins and minimum
capital requirements for trading derivatives than currently exist. This is
also the rationale behind the infusion of cash from a consortium of
investment and commercial banks that the New York Federal Reserve
61. See Roberta Romano, Derivative Securities Regulation, in 1 THE NEW PALORAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 590 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter THE NEW
PALRAVE].
62. See THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, OVER-THE-COUNTER
DE ivATIVrEs MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 1, 3 (1999) (available at
<httpi//www.reas.gov/pressreleases/ps224.html>) (visited February 25, 2000).
63. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES-ACTIONS TAKEN OR
PROPOSED SINCE MAY 1994, at 5 (1996), available in 1996 WL 660583.
64. A partial list of investors who have suffered big public losses involving derivatives includes:
Barrings Bank; Orange County, California; Metallgesellschaft A.G.; Dell Computer, San Diego
County; Askin Capital Management; Odessa College; Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia; Shown
Shell Sekiyu; Kashima Oil; Pacific Horizon Funds of Bank of America; Procter & Gamble; Community
Bankers U.S. Government Money Market Fund; Gibson Greetings; and Air Products and Chemicals.
See Brandon Becker & Jennifer Yoon, Derivative Financial Losses, 21 J. CORP. L. 215 (1995) (listing
over 100 instances of what the popular press identifies as financial losses involving derivatives).
65. See Krawiec, supra note 40, at 47 (containing a thoughtful discussion of the systemic risk in
derivatives trading and markets).
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brokered together to buy out LTCM 6 Of course, this event only fueled
criticism that it was high time to impose tight regulatory controls over OTC
derivatives to prevent similar crises. Some legal scholars fear that colorful
depictions of such crises will cause knee-jerk regulatory overreactions.
67
Fortunately, there have not been any hasty statutory reforms thus far.
Certainly, the recent headline-making losses involving OTC derivatives
prompted another round of academic studies and government reports
regarding OTC derivatives markets. Regulatory proposals included the
CFTC serving as a gatekeeper for OTC derivatives or the CFTC using the
Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) to declare OTC derivatives legally
unenforceable.68
Derivatives permit global capital market participants to hedge
volatility in those underlying financial markets. Yet many past and current
U.S. regulatory debates about derivatives only pay lip service to hedging
risks efficiently and instead revolve around political or jurisdictional turf
battles. This type of interagency fighting is a product of our country's
path-dependent financial regulatory maze. Whether a new derivative is
classified as a futures contract or a security determines whether the CFTC
or the SEC, respectively, regulates that new derivative. The United States
might some day adopt a functional approach to financial regulation instead
of the prevailing division of the "pizza pie" of assets that results from
squeezing assets into prescribed legal pigeonholes. Recent legislation
"allows banks, securities firms and insurance companies to form one-stop
financial conglomerates marketing a range of financial products such as
annuities, certificates of deposit, stocks, and bonds."6 9 This essential repeal
of the Glass-Steagall Act of 193370 may be a harbinger of things to come.
But, in the meantime, derivatives regulation is a complicated regime
consisting of a messy "patchwork quilt" of agency decisions, case law,
regulations, and statutes that are the "product of a political compromise in a
longstanding jurisdictional turf battle between the SEC and the CFTC and
66. See Lewis, supra note 37, at 71; Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, A Hedge Fund Falters
and Big Banks Agree To Ante Up $3.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1998, at AI (reporting on the fear
of systemic risk as motivating the Federal Reserve's involvement).
67. See Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus Main Street: How Ignorance, Hyperbole, and
Fear Lead to Regulation, 65 U. Cu. L. REv. 1487, 1509 (1998) (reviewing FRANK PARTNOY,
F.I.A.S.C.O.: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALm STREET TRADER (1999)).
68. See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the
Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 767, 775 (1999) (proposing regulatory intervention in
OTC derivatives markets).
69. Michael Schroeder, Clinton Signs Financial-Services Bill, But Cautions About Privacy
Shortfalls, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1999, at A41.
70. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24,78,377,378 (1994).
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their clientele exchanges."' Innovators of derivatives in the U.S. face a
host of legal and regulatory uncertainties that result from our tangled
definitional web approach to regulating assets.72 There are many excellent
detailed accounts of the current U.S. classification-based,
compartmentalized and overlapping regulations of derivatives.7 3 Although
many commentators bemoan such a hodge-podge and prefer a single
financial super-regulator, other commentators believe that jurisdictional
competition promotes efficiency in regulation.
74
It is often claimed that derivatives are merely instruments for
speculation. In contrast, the primary markets for primitive assets, such as
bonds and stock, allow households to save or invest and permit
corporations to raise capital. While derivatives permit individuals and
organizations to insure against fluctuations in the prices of primitive assets,
derivatives also facilitate betting on primitive asset prices. The fact that
trading in derivatives is a zero-sum game between the counter-parties and
an analogy to gambling is probably responsible for the view that derivative
asset markets are just like huge organized casinos.75  Of course, this
analogy underplays the important social benefits that derivatives markets
provide not only in terms of additional hedging opportunities, but also in
terms of the primitive assets' increased liquidity and public price
information.
But, secondary market trading for even primitive assets can be the
result of differences in any of the following: tastes for risk and for patience,
random initial endowments over time, productivity in transforming initial
endowments into marketable commodities, or beliefs concerning the future
71. Romano, supra note 54, at 44.
72. See Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain
Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L. RE'. 1431, 1460 (1991).
73. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 8, at 181-227; Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra,
Developments in U.S. Derivatives Regulation, in THE HANDBOOK OF EQUITY DERIVATIVES, supra note
11, at 609; Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Regulation and Title V of the Futures
Trading Practices Act of 1992, FUTURES INT'L L. LETrER, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 11-19. See, e.g.,
EDWARD F. GREENE, ALAN L. BELLER, GEORGE M. COHEN, MANLY 0. HUDSON, JR. & EDWARD J.
ROSEN, 2 U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS §§
13.01-.06 (4th ed. 1998); Joanne T. Medero, Swaps and Other Derivatives: Regulatory and Legislative
Developments, 10 REV. BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 117 (1994).
74. See Edward J. Kane, Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition
Between the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS 367, 383 (1984); Gary L.
Seevers, Comments on "Innovation, Competition and New Contract Design in Futures Markets", 1 J.
FUTURES MARKETS 157, 158 (1981) (arguing that jurisdictional competition may result in efficiency
benefits and regulation more responsive to market participants and exchanges).
75. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 705 (1995).
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states of the world. The observed volume and price volatility of both
primitive and derivative asset trading seems to be much greater than can be
explained by differences in preferences, income, or capabilities. However,
if a significant amount of asset trading is due to differences in traders'
expectations, there are two puzzles. First, why do investors have diverse
beliefs? Second, if the answer to the first question is that expectations vary
due to differential knowledge, then why do informational disparities
persist? In other words, why does one trader's willingness to trade not lead
the other trader to suspect that the former has private knowledge and thus
lead the latter to refuse to trade on the proposed terms?
7 6
Such no-trade results are memorably called "Groucho Marx"
propositions in which a rational trader is never willing to trade with another
rational trader who is willing to trade with that first trader on the proposed
terms.7 7 There are necessary and sufficient conditions on the degree of
irrationality traders must exhibit for those traders to bet, speculate, or agree
to disagree with each other.78 Thus, if we observe speculation involving
derivatives and the conditions of these formal results apply, then we may
logically conclude from these necessary and sufficient conditions that some
traders experience certain specific types of information processing
difficulties. That conclusion in turn has implications for regulating
derivatives markets. Much of the current U.S. federal securities regulatory
philosophy is based on a model of consumer sovereignty. In contrast to the
merit-based regulation of some state blue-sky securities laws, our federal
securities laws are based on an overall principle of disclosure regulation.
Such a nonpatemalistic policy assumes that investors not only can, but also
do process disclosed information by and large in a uniform and unbiased
fashion. Yet, evidence from behavioral economics and behavioral finance
suggests that cognitive biases most likely permeate human processing of
76. For formal statements of the no-trade results, see John D. Geanakoplos & Heraklis M.
Polemarchakis, We Can't Disagree Forever, 28 J. ECON. THEORY 192 (1982); Paul Milgrom & Nancy
Stokey, Information, Trade and Common Knowledge, 26 J. ECON. THEORY 17 (1982). For the
applicability to legal policy about speculation, see Paul G. Mahoney, Is There A Cure for "Excessive"
Trading?, 81 VA. L. REV. 713 (1995) (proposing agency costs as an alternative rationale for excessive
trading); Lynn A. Stout, Agreeing To Disagree over Excessive Trading, 81 VA. L. REV. 751 (1995)
(arguing that excessive trading is due to heterogeneous beliefs).
77. Groucho Marx reportedly said that he would never date any woman who would be willing to
date him nor join a club that would accept him as a member.
78. For articles stating and proving such conditions, see John D. Geanakoplos, Game Theory
Without Partitions and Applications to Speculation and Consensus (1989) (unpublished manuscript,
Cowles Found. Discussion Paper 914, Yale University, on file with author); Dov Samet, Ignoring
Ignorance andAgreeing to Disagree, 60 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (1990).
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information.79 Certain aspects of the federal securities registration process,
such as the quiet period and the prohibitions against conditioning the
market by gun-jumping, are best understood as responses to behavioral
heuristics."0 Finally, the multidimensional nature of risks can overwhelm
learning by asset market participants and lead to herding, informational
cascades and price bubbles."' As the number of dimensions or sources of
risk increase, so does the likelihood that asset markets are incomplete. But,
derivatives provide a source of multidimensionality in prices that might in
turn reduce herding and price bubbles.
8 2
Professor Lynn Stout argues that recent financial theoretical models of
investors with heterogeneous beliefs have anti-speculative implications for
regulating OTC derivatives.8 3 The recent study of investors with rational
but heterogeneous beliefs is beginning to generate much renewed interest
among economists.8 4 Thus, it might be important for legal scholars to
understand the implications for securities regulation of models inhabited by
investors who have diverse but rational beliefs. In a series of articles, Stout
argues that models involving heterogeneous expectations provide novel
insights about derivatives trading,85  excessive trading,86  mandatory
79. See generally GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BIG MONEY
MISATKES AND How TO CORRECT THEM: LESSONS FROM THE NEw SCIENCE OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS (1999); HERSH SHEFRiN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000).
80. See Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation in an Electronic Age: The Impact of
Cognitive Psychology, 75 WASH. U.'L.Q. 779,783 (1997).
81. See Christopher Avery & Peter Zemsky, Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in
Financial Markets, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 724,731-36,740 (1998) (demonstrating the possibility of herd
behavior, informational cascades and price bubbles when there are several dimensions of risk).
82. See id. at 741 (conjecturing that multidimensional prices lead to less pronounced herding and
price bubbles and noting that derivatives such as options provide a natural source of multidimensional
prices).
83. See Stout, supra note 68, at 741 (discussing regulatory implications of investors with
heterogeneous beliefs).
84. See SERGIO FOCARDI & CAROLINE JONAS, MODELING THE MARKET: NEW THEORIES AND
TECHNIQUES 10 (1997) (describing potential forecasting applications of Kurz's research). See also,
e.g., ENDOGENOUS ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF RATIONAL BELIEFS
(Mordecai Kurz ed., 1997) (describing this research).
85. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions
of Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53 (1995)
(arguing that derivatives trading can be socially harmful).
86. See Stout, supra note 76, at 755; Lynn A. Stout, Irrational Expectations, 3 LEGAL THEORY
227, 239-47 (1997) (criticizing rational expectations models and no-trade results for their theoretical
and empirical weaknesses). But see Mahoney, supra note 76, at 715 (providing an alternative reason
for excessive trading).
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disclosure,8 7 corporate financial behavior,8 8  and legal rules against
speculation.
89
Even if some people use derivatives to speculate on underlying
financial prices or volatility, other people can also use those same
derivatives to realize a myriad of nonspeculative objectives. People can
utilize derivatives to gain information, hedge, change their financial
positions without trading, raise or invest cash, change yields, calm
corporate customers, profit from relative mispricing, diversify, customize
payoffs, and insure against disasters.90 This Article focuses on the roles
that derivatives play in diversifying or hedging risks, raising or investing
cash, customizing payoffs, and insuring against financial disasters.
I. THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY OF INCOMPLETE
ASSET MARKETS
The neoclassical financial economic theory of competitive asset
markets is built upon a particular conception of individual decisionmaking.
This conception is that of a rational actor making decisions in the face of
risk. A well-known economist once distinguished "risk" from
"uncertainty" as follows.9 When facing risk, a decisionmaker faces
randomness that involves quantifiable probability distributions. 92 When
facing uncertainty, a decisionmaker faces randomness that is not
quantifiable in terms of probability distributions. The modem view of
randomness as quantifiable risk is very much that of statistical decision
theory.93 The alternative viewpoint of randomness as uncertainty has its
ardent supporters, including the famous macroeconomist John Maynard
Keynes. 94 Indeed, the twists and turns of various attitudes toward, and
87. See Stout, supra note 75 (arguing for a different regulatory philosophy for the SEC).
88. See Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under
Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOzO L. REV. 475, 475 (1997) (arguing for a
different philosophy towards corporate takeover law).
89. See Stout, supra note 68, at 770-82 (arguing for anti-speculation based laws).
90. See Black, supra note 11, at ix-xi.
91. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 233 (1921) (distinguishing between
risk and uncertainty).
92. See id.
93. See generally LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954) (describing
modem statistical decision theory).
94. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 22-28 (1921) (discussing how
insurance underwriting business practices and judicial opinions endorse the general position that much
of economic randomness is difficult to quantify precisely); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 149-152 (1936) (arguing that expectations about
long-term investments are ultimately based on precarious conventions rather than rational intuitions).
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conceptions of, randomness are fascinating. 95 The pendulum of perception
of randomness has alternated between intuitive feeling and quantitative
measurement. The word "risk" comes from two sources: the Greek "rhiza"
that relates to sailing around a cliff and the Italian "risicare" that means to
dare.96 While many laboratory experimental findings document that most
people view randomness as uncertainty rather than risk, models of
randomness as uncertainty instead of risk only recently appeared in the
theoretical economics literature. 7
In fact, theoretical economics is currently undergoing a renaissance of
interest about uncertainty in the sense that Frank Knight used the term,
namely to describe situations in which randomness entails unknown
probabilities. 98  Theoretical financial applications of such uncertainty
include the optimal choice of a portfolio,99 excess volatility of stock
prices, 00 inter-temporal asset pricing,' 10 the information revealed by
security prices,10 2 and the incompleteness of contracts. 0 3  A legal and
regulatory application of Knightian uncertainty explains the current United
States regulation of derivatives as the result of what demanders and
suppliers of such regulation desire."0 A recent general equilibrium model
formally shows how incomplete asset markets can occur endogenously due
95. See Peter L. Bernstein, Risk as a History of Ideas, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 10
(describing the history of humanity's perceptions of randomness).
96. See iL at 8.
97. See generally Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling
Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325 (1992) (providing an
overview of the experimental and theoretical literature on ambiguity).
98. For a theoretical model of Knightian uncertainty, see David Schmeidler, Subjective
Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity, 57 ECONOMETRICA 571 (1989).
99. See generally James Dow & Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa Werlang, Uncertainty, Risk Aversion,
and the Optimal Choice of a Portfolio, 60 ECONOMETRICA 197 (1992) (modeling an investor's portfolio
choice problem in the presence of uncertainty).
100. See generally James Dow & Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa Werlang, Excess Volatility of Stock
Prices and Knightian Uncertainty, 36 EUR. ECON. REV. 631 (1992) (modeling uncertainty as a cause of
excess stock price volatility).
101. See generally Larry Epstein & Tan Wang, Intertemporal Asset Pricing Under Knightian
Uncertainty, 62 ECONOMETRIA 283 (1994) (modeling multi-period asset pricing in the presence of
uncertainty).
102. See Jean-Marc Talon, Asymmetric Information, Nonadditive Expected Utility, and the
Information Revealed By Prices: An Example, 39 INT'L ECON. REV. 329 (1998) (modeling how asset
prices can reveal private information in the presence of uncertainty).
103. See Sujoy Mukerji, Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Contractual Form, 88 AM.
ECON. Rnv. 1207, 1220 (1998) (modeling incomplete contracts in the presence of uncertainty).
104. See Christopher L. Culp, Functional and Institutional Interaction, Regulatory Uncertainty,
and the Economics of Derivatives Regulation, in DERIVATIVES HANDBOOK: RISK MANAGEMENT AND
CONTROL 458,464-65,486-87 (Robert J. Schwartz & Clifford W. Smith, Jr. eds., 1997).
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to uncertainty-averse investors.105 The motivation behind uncertainty-
aversion is that decisionmakers often possess ambiguous or vague
information concerning the randomness they face. 10 6 There are numerous
experimental studies, such as Ellsberg's paradox, 07 finding that people are
uncertainty averse. The intuition supporting these findings, all other things
being equal, is that the more vague a decisionmaker's knowledge over the
uncertainty she faces the more conservatively she acts. The long-awaited
November 1999 report prepared by the President's Working Group on
Financial Markets entitled "Over-The-Counter Derivatives Markets and the
Commodity Exchange Act" recommended changing the CEA to promote
innovation in OTC derivatives markets by providing legal certainty for
OTC derivatives.' Uncertainty aversion on the part of OTC derivative
transaction counter-parties offers cognitive and empirical reasons to
support that recommendation.
The canonical financial economic framework for studying the role of
assets in allocating risk is the general competitive equilibrium model of
asset markets developed by Nobel Prize-winning economist Kenneth J.
Arrow.10 9 His formulation of competitive asset markets has become the
prototypical model par excellence of theoretical financial economics.
Arrow studied a competitive economy with not only commodity markets,
but also a complete set of state-contingent asset markets. The concept of a
105. See Sujoy Mukerji & Jean-Marc Tallon, Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of
Financial Markets (Oct. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Economic Theory workshop,
University of Pennsylvania, on file with the author) (modeling uncertainty as a cause for incomplete
asset markets).
106. See SHEFRIN, supra note 79, at 20-21 (discussing aversion to ambiguity and fear of the
unknown as its emotional aspect with an application to what motivated the participants in the private
rescue of Long-Term Capital Management).
107. See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axiomrs, 75 Q.J. EcON. 643 (1961). In
the original description of this paradox, an urn contains 100 balls of the same weight and size. In fact,
all 100 balls are indistinguishable except for color. The urn contains 30 red balls and 60 other balls that
are blue and yellow in unknown proportions. One ball is drawn at random from this urn. Experiments
find that many people will prefer to bet on that randomly drawn ball being red rather than blue and will
prefer to bet on that randomly drawn ball being blue or yellow rather than red or yellow.
108. See THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCLAL MARKETS, supra note 62, at 3. See
also Alan Greenspan, Testimony Before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, U.S.
Senate (Feb. 10, 2000) (transcript available at
<http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocsltestimony/2000/20000210.htm> (supporting recommendations
of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets to modernize the CEA by removing legal
uncertainties regarding OTC derivatives).
109. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Le Role des Valeurs Boursieres Pour la Repartition la Meillure des
Risques, 40 EONOMETRIE COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX Du CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA
REsERCHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 41 (1953); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal
Allocation of Risk Bearing, 31 REV. EcON. STUD. 91 (1964) (providing a formal theoretical model of
the role of complete and competitive asset markets in allocating risk).
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state of the environment, or state of the world, or state of nature (not the
Nature of property rights) represents the randomness of the world in terms
of risk over which state of the world will occur. The states of the world
form an exhaustive and mutually exclusive description of the risk that
economic agents care about. Their exhaustiveness means that at least one
state must occur, while their mutual exclusiveness means that at most one
state will realize. Thus, a flip of a fair, unbiased coin will result in one of
two possible states: heads or tails. Many financial valuation models are
based on Arrow's paradigm of states of the world. Examples of such
theories include the binomial or two-state option pricing models pioneered
by Sharpe and extended by Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein, in which underlying
prices are treated as exogenous states instead of as endogenous variables
whose values are determined in an equilibrium model.110
Arrow assumed that there are as many asset markets as there are
possible states of the world. This assumption is a very strong and
counterfactual one. Introspection reveals that although there are many
asset markets, there are far fewer asset markets than conceivable states.
Complete asset markets mean that any possible payoff pattern over time
and under alternative future scenarios can be achieved by trading on asset
markets. Arrow's model of a complete set of competitive asset markets
extends his and Gerard Debreu's neoclassical general equilibrium (GE)
model of an economy under certainty with competitive commodity markets
but no asset markets."1 I Not only did this canonical GE model clarify the
precise minimal set of conditions for existence of a GE, but it also
formalized Adam Smith's metaphor of an invisible hand. 112 Arrow and
Debreu formally proved what have come to be known as the two
fundamental theorems of welfare economics, namely that the GE of a
system of competitive markets is Pareto-efficient (the first theorem) and
conversely that any Pareto-efficient allocation is the GE of competitive
markets after the government makes income transfers (the second
110. See WI.LIAM F. SILARPE, INVESMENTS ch. 16 (2d ed. 1981) (providing the first example of
binomial option pricing). See generally James C. Cox, Stephen A. Ross & Mark Rubinstein, Option
Pricing: A Simplified Approach, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 229 (1979); Richard J. Rendleman, Jr. & Brit J.
Bartter, Two-State Option Pricing, 34 J. FIN. 1093 (1979) (building complete models based on Sharpe's
insight).
111. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a
Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMErRICA 265 (1954) (proving existence and Pareto efficiency of GE
in a model of competitive commodity markets).
112. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 423 (Edwin Carman ed., Modem Library 1937) (providing metaphor of an invisible hand).
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theorem).113 These results "stand as the cornerstone of postwar normative
economics, and the Arrow and Debreu proofs contain perhaps the best
known arguments in the history of formal economics. Part of the attraction
of the theorems is that they seem to justify the sweeping market reforms
that economists have long advocated.
114
GE theory proceeded to provide a standard research paradigm for
analyzing the equilibrium properties of a decentralized system of
competitive markets. The archetypal research paradigm is to demonstrate
that a competitive equilibrium satisfies five desirable properties: existence,
Pareto-efficiency, uniqueness, stability, and robustness. Of course, the
sufficient conditions for each of these properties can and usually will differ
across the properties. Existence of a competitive equilibrium can be
thought of as checking for the internal consistency of the model. Pareto-
efficiency of a competitive equilibrium can be viewed as providing a
minimal welfare criterion. Uniqueness of a competitive equilibrium
requires quite restrictive hypotheses. But, local uniqueness or determinacy
does not require such restrictive assumptions and it suffices to permit
analysis of how a particular equilibrium changes as the parameters of a GE
model vary." 5 Stability of a competitive equilibrium can refer to global or
local stability. A GE is globally stable if it is the asymptotic limit of a
dynamic adjustment process defined globally over the space of all possible
prices. A GE is locally stable if small disturbances to it set in motion
forces that will lead to a return to it. Finally, robustness, or structural
stability, holds if a competitive equilibrium exists for most of typical
parameter values of the model.116 In other words, nonexistence of a
competitive equilibrium is rare or accidental.
The adjective "general" distinguishes general equilibrium analysis
from partial equilibrium analysis, which studies a particular market by
itself in isolation from the rest of an economy. Thus, the demand and
supply analysis taught in an introductory microeconomics principles course
focuses on a discrete and insular competitive market, such as the market for
artichokes or that for broccoli. Usually, demand and supply analysis only
mentions in passing the notion of complements, such as tea and lemons,
113. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare
Economics, in SECOND BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS & PROBABILITY (J.
Neyman ed., 1951); Gerard Debreu, The Coefficient of Resource Utilization, 19 ECONOMmRICA 273
(1951).
114. MICHAEL MANDLER, DILEMMAS IN ECONOMIC THEORY: PERSISTING FOUNDATIONAL
PROBLEMS OF MICROECONOMICS 151 (1999).
115. Economists refer to such an analysis as comparative statics.
116. Economists refer to robustness as regularity or genericity.
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and the notion of substitutes, such as coffee and tea. It is only in an
intermediate microeconomics course that students learn about GE theory,
usually in preparation for covering the first and second fundamental
theorems of welfare economics.1" 7 Although undergraduates are often
caught up in the algebra of solving a system of simultaneous equations, the
main conceptual point of GE analysis is that an economy is an
interconnected systemic whole that cannot be simply decomposed into its
individual component sectors or markets. A consumer's demand for any
particular commodity x depends not only upon its own price, but also upon
other commodity prices. Economists decompose such price dependencies
into two components. First, when the price of a commodity y changes,
there is a change in the rate at which the market permits a consumer to
substitute between commodities x and y. This change in relative prices
causes a change in a consumer's demand for commodity x. That change in
consumer demand is known as the substitution effect," 8 so named because
a consumer substitutes away from relatively more expensive commodities
towards relatively more inexpensive commodities. Second, when the price
of a commodity y changes, there is a change in a consumer's real (in
contrast with nominal) income or purchasing power. This change in real
income also causes a change in a consumer's demand for commodity x.
That change in consumer demand is known as the income effect,119 so
named because a consumer has less real income when the price of a
commodity y increases and more real income when the price of a
commodity y decreases. Similarly, due to substitutability in production
technologies, a firm's supply for any particular commodity depends not
only upon the prices of other available commodities, but also upon the
prices of inputs.
The above set of price interdependencies applies to markets for both
commodities and assets. Indeed, the income and substitution effects for
investors' demands and the substitution effects for the supply of assets will
often be quite large in their magnitudes "because of the high degree of
substitutability and low transaction costs that characterize modem capital
markets." 120  Such income and substitution effects play key roles in
explaining many of the phenomena that can occur in a GE model that
cannot occur in partial equilibrium analysis.
117. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 522-
23, 529 (5th ed. 1999) (providing an exposition of the first and second welfare theorems).
118. See id. at 137 (defining the substitution effect of a price change).
119. See id. at 141 (defining the income effect of a price change).
120. Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets
Perspective, 102 YALE LJ. 387,390 (1992).
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Aside from being technically incorrect when speaking of a single
market being in equilibrium because markets are interconnected, GE
analysis is particularly appropriate for studying derivatives innovation and
financial engineering because of capital markets' increasing globalization
and linkages to derivatives markets. Advances in telecommunications and
information technologies mean that derivative markets and their underlying
asset markets are linked more than ever with each other. This includes the
markets for derivatives and their underlying assets as well as asset markets
in other countries. The Latin America debt problems, the Russian financial
debacle, and the Asian currency crisis all had large impacts on capital and
asset markets physically removed from those regions. In addition,
advances in computing technologies make possible sophisticated
quantitative trading and statistical arbitrage involving derivative assets, the
underlying assets those derivatives are based upon, and foreign assets. The
age of digital capitalism can be summarized by saying that capital is quite
mobile in responding to relative prices between international asset markets,
derivative asset markets and related underlying asset markets. This fluidity
has increased in speed and scope over recent years. For all of these
reasons, a GE approach to financial innovation and engineering is more
descriptively realistic than any partial equilibrium analysis of those same
phenomena.
A recent development in theoretical financial economics is modeling a
society with competitive but incomplete asset markets.' An impetus for
this flurry of research is that real world asset markets remain incomplete
despite the fact that in the limit, adding enough options markets can
effectively complete asset markets. 122  In other words, "[d]espite the
dramatic advance of derivatives during recent years, the real world is still a
far cry from the Arrow-Debreu benchmark. And, although derivatives will
contribute to moving the real world closer to the theoretical ideal, it will
always remain far removed." '123 When asset markets are incomplete, there
are some profiles or distributions of payoffs across time and over possible
futures that investors cannot realize by trading on the existing asset
markets. The general equilibrium of incomplete asset markets (GE) theory
sheds light on the potential for and limits of asset innovation in hedging
risk. This theory is now over a quarter of a century old and provides the
121. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL MAGILL & MARTNE QuINzn, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE
MARKETS (1996) (providing an exposition of GEl).
122. See generally Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 Q.J. ECON. 75 (1976) (proving
that introducing sufficiently many options markets complete asset markets).
123. STENHERR, supra note 6, at 134.
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foundation for a rigorous analysis of government regulatory policy towards
derivatives. GEI theory answers three important distinct but related
questions. First, are the incomplete asset markets that exist in a particular
society the appropriate ones for that economy? In other words, do the
benefits of introducing any particular new derivative market, such as a
futures market written on a commodity, exceed the costs that derivative
market would have on society? Second, even if a benevolent regulator is
constrained to not introduce new assets and only utilize the existing set of
asset markets, can that benevolent regulator make everyone better off by
reallocating portfolio holdings of those existing incomplete set of assets?
In other words, do market forces ensure that the existing incomplete asset
markets function to their full potential? Third, for both of the above
questions, there is a further implementation question. That is whether
informational and political economy considerations render any theoretically
beneficial government regulatory interventions unlikely. After all, "[tihe
important issue is not whether some idealized notion of a 'free market' is
superior to some idealized notion of 'regulation."
' 124
A. GENERIC NORMATIVE INDETERMINACY OF DERIVATIVES
INNOVATIONS
An early numerical example in the literature demonstrated that
introducing new derivative asset markets could move society from one GEI
to another that is Pareto-dominated by that original GEI. 2 5 The possibility
that a particular GEI may Pareto-dominate another means that the process
of derivative innovation does not necessarily increase societal welfare
monotonically in the number of assets. A standard argument of those
seeking approval from the CFTC to market a new futures contract is that
the new asset expands the set of potential investments available to
investors. Indeed, the new futures contract is presumably designed and
test-marketed to address the hedging requirements of a particular group of
investors. The fact that introducing additional assets brings asset markets
closer to being complete probably explains the prevailing economic and
regulatory orthodoxy that new derivatives should be routinely approved
unless there are clearly problems from introducing those new derivatives.
"[S]ince incomplete markets [sic] equilibria are in general suboptimal,
124. David E. Van Zandt, The Market as a Property Institution: Rules for the Trading of
Financial Assets, 32 B.C. L. REv. 967, 1025 (1991).
125. See Oliver Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure Is Incomplete,
I1 J. ECON. THEORY 418, 439-42 (1975) (providing a counter-example to the proposition that adding
assets to an incomplete asset market economy is always Pareto-improving).
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there will be demand by agents for increased opportunities to manage risk,
and fulfilling this demand should increase the welfare of everyone in the
economy. After all, the argument runs, with more choices, how can anyone
go wrong?"'12 6 While adding the last asset market before complete asset
markets are achieved is clearly a Pareto-improvement over the situation
where just one asset was missing, that same logic and reasoning does not
apply when more than just one asset is missing.
Hart constructed a particular numerical example demonstrating that if
more than one asset market is required to complete asset markets, as is
most likely the case, then derivative innovation can decrease the welfare of
all consumers and investors. 27 Economic theorists have only recently
demonstrated the robustness and generality of the phenomenon captured by
Hart's example. Sufficient conditions for asset innovations to be Pareto-
improving are quite restrictive. For example, if an economy has only a
single commodity, generically there is an asset whose introduction makes
everybody better off.128  But, for generic economies with at least two
commodities, if asset markets are sufficiently incomplete, then derivative
innovation can arbitrarily perturb households' equilibrium utilities. 129 In
other words, new derivatives can make all households better off, all worse
off, or however one's heart desires in terms of the distribution of welfare.
This result might seem counterintuitive because derivative innovation
enlarges the choice sets available to households by increasing their
attainable span from trading in assets of income levels across different
states of the world. But, such a result becomes intuitively clearer upon
realizing that an increase in hedging opportunities and households utilizing
such new opportunities affects the set of existing hedging opportunities
including changing the prices of existing assets and commodities. Those
asset market price changes effectively shift income over time while those
commodity market price changes effectively transfer income across
possible future states of the world when there is more than one commodity.
Investors will typically disagree about how to value an extra amount of
126. Ronel Elul, Welfare Effects of Financial Innovation in Incomplete Markets with Several
Consumption Goods, 11 J. ECON. THEORY43, 43(1995).
127. For an example of an economy with two consumers, two commodities, three dates, two states
of the world, and no assets, in which opening a commodity futures market can make both consumers
worse off than before that asset innovation, see Hart, supra note 125, at 439-42.
128. See Ronel Elul, Welfare-Improving Financial Innovation with a Single Good, 13 ECON.
THEORY 25, 25-27, 33 (1999) (proving this result).
129. See David Cass & Alessandro Citanna, Pareto Improving Financial Innovation in Incomplete
Markets, 11 ECON. THEORY 467, 469 (1998) (proving the welfare indeterminacy of generic financial
innovation); Elul, supra note 126, at 55, 58-73 (proving that for generic economies it is possible to
arbitrarily perturb investors' equilibrium utilities by asset innovation).
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consumption across these states if asset markets are sufficiently
incomplete. In other words, "prices will generally change when a new
nonredundant asset is added to the market, even when the number of
existing securities is large."'
130
B. GENERIC CONSTRAINED INEFFICIENCY OF INCOMPLETE
ASSET MARKETS
A main lesson of GEI theory is that if asset markets are incomplete,
they may work rather poorly. To extend Adam Smith's famous metaphor,
an invisible hand with two fingers missing not only is not as effective as an
invisible hand with all five fingers, but such a hand also does not even
utilize its remaining three fingers as well as can be done.' 3' Some of the
properties of a complete asset market GE must be significantly modified
for a GEI, while other properties of a complete asset market GE may fail to
hold altogether for a GEL An example of the latter is that a GEl will no
longer exist for all possible values of the parameters describing an
economy, such as tastes, initial resources, production technologies, and
marketed assets. Instead, GEI only exist for most values of the parameters
describing an economy. An example of the former is that when asset
markets are incomplete, Pareto-efficiency is not an appropriate welfare
criterion because when asset markets are missing, being unable to reach a
first-best outcome is not surprising. Instead, the welfare criterion should be
less demanding than unconstrained Pareto-efficiency. A possible welfare
criterion is that of constrained Pareto-efficiency or allocating resources as
efficiently as can be done utilizing the existing set of incomplete asset
markets. When an economy has more than one commodity, a GEI usually
fails to satisfy even such a limited concept of efficiency. 132 In other words,
a GEI is constrained Pareto-inefficient for most or typical economies.
But, if asset markets remain incomplete in the face of derivative asset
innovations, a benevolent regulator can in principle improve the utilities of
investors by reallocating their portfolios of existing assets without
130. Nils H. Hakansson, The Fantastic World of Finance: Progress and the Free Lunch, 14 J. FIN.
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 717,723 (1979).
131. My colleague Seth Kreimer suggested this vivid metaphor.
132. Naturally, the case of an economy with just one commodity is unlikely. But in such an
economy with just one commodity in each state of the world, an asset allocation determines a unique
allocation for that commodity independent of individual preferences because there is only a single
commodity for individuals to spend their income on and consume. Hence, such an economy is
equivalent to an economy where preferences are defined on asset allocations directly instead of on
allocations of that one commodity.
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completing asset markets. 133 Such a result demonstrates that competitive
but incomplete asset markets not only fail to achieve the first-best world
that occurs under a complete set of competitive asset markets, but also they
even fail to allocate resources and risk as efficiently as is possible given
those incomplete asset markets. Thus, GEI models provide a theoretical
basis for governmental intervention to improve asset market performance
and investors' welfare.
The reason why GEI typically are constrained Pareto-inefficient is that
in a GEI, households "trade assets given spot market prices. In the notion
of constrained Pareto-efficiency, the fictive planner can anticipate the
changes in spot market prices that are induced by reallocating assets among
consumers. This gives him some extra flexibility to redistribute income
across states."
134
In other words, a reallocation of asset portfolio holdings could alter
spot commodity market prices that in turn causes a redistribution of real
income not attainable by trading assets at their current prices. This is only
possible in a GEI because in a complete asset market, any pattern of real
income is attainable by trading in assets. The last fact is of course the
raison d'tre for the difference between complete and incomplete asset
markets.
The feedback effect of asset portfolio holdings on spot commodity
market prices, and hence the distribution of real income, constitutes a
pecuniary externality. Even though such an externality is pecuniary,
meaning that it is being mediated by the price system, it still raises the
possibility that government regulators could improve the risk and allocation
of resources by taking into account income effects of asset portfolio
holdings on consumption of commodities. The precise scenario that can
occur with just a single derivative is demonstrated in the appendix via a
simple numerical example of an economy where a regulator increases
everybody's utility by redistributing holdings of that one asset and thus
moving from one GEI to another. 135 An analogous phenomenon is that of
133. See John D. Geanakoplos & Herakis M. Polemarchakis, Existence, Regularity, and
Constrained Suboptimality of Competitive Portfolio Allocations when the Asset Market Is Incomplete,
in 2 UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION, AND COMMUNICATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF KENNETH J. ARROW
65, 89 (Walter P. Heller, Ross M. Starr & David A. Starrett eds., 1986) (proving that GEl are typically
constrained Pareto-inefficient).
134. Thorsten Hens, Incomplete Markets, in ELEMENTS OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
139, 167 (Alan Kirman ed., 1998).
135. This example can be found in tables 1 and 2 of Charles Wilson, Incomplete Markets, in 2
THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 759,760 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter
Newman eds., 1987).
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individuals profiting from the pecuniary effects of technological
innovation. 136 That phenomenon itself is analogous to many Americans
having a large part of their wealth tied up in their homes. Changes in real
estate prices can then result in huge windfalls or losses with attendant
income effects on real consumption. A similar type of situation is the
impact on the competitive market equilibrium price of an underlying stock
caused by the introduction of an option for that stock. 137 Such a concern
resulted in the prohibition under U.S. laws of trading futures contracts on
onions, which continues to this day. 135 Such types of price linkages also
underlie the concerns of some asset market observers that portfolio
insurance and option replication trading strategies may exacerbate the
volatility of the underlying markets and perhaps even cause them to
crash. 139  These sorts of price correlations also motivate the concerns of
some legal academics that individuals may circumvent insider trading
securities laws by trading in assets that do not fall under the legal definition
of securities, but whose prices are correlated with the prices of securities.
140
Finally, financial innovators might be motivated by the impact on the
prices of existing assets of their innovating assets.
141
Finally, before moving onto the regulatory implications of the above
set of normative results in Parts I.A and 1I.B, a pair of technical details
about both results is worth mentioning. First, both results are demonstrated
in what are known as pure exchange models that involve no production.
Fortunately, GEI models extend to production economies. 142  Second, the
results hold for any derivative whose payoff is a linear function of an
underlying price or a combination of prices, as is the case with a derivative
that is written on an index. In other words, the proofs of the normative
136. See generally Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward
to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971) (modeling how there may be incentives for more
technological innovation than socially optimal).
137. See generally Jerome Detemple & Larry Selden, A General Equilibrium Analysis of Option
and Stock Market Interactions, 32 INT'L. ECON. REV. 279 (1991) (modeling such feedback interactions
between stock and stock option prices).
138. See Elul, supra note 126, at 44.
139. See generally BRUCE I. JACOBS, CAPITAL IDEAS AND MARKET REALITIES: OPTION
REPLICATION, INVESTOR BEHAVIOR AND STOCK MARKET CRASHES (1999).
140. See generally Ian Ayres & Joseph Bankman, Trading in Stock Substitutes (Mar. 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, presented at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and
Economics workshop, on file with the author).
141. See generally Franklin Alien & Douglas Gale, Optimal Security Design, I REV. FIN. STUD.
229 (1988) (modeling such a motivation for financial innovators).
142. See John D. Geanakoplos, M. Magill, M. Quinzii & J. Dreze, Generic Inefficiency of Stock
Market Equilibrium When Markets Are Incomplete, 19 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 113, 114 (1990)
(proving several inefficiency results about incomplete stock market economies).
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results only apply to forwards, futures, and derivatives that are based on
them, such as swaps. What is unresolved is whether those results extend to
any derivative whose payoff is a nonlinear function of an underlying price
or a combination of prices because the formal proofs do not apply to
European options, American options, and option-based derivatives. 143 The
technical reason for this gap is that a European option pays out zero over a
broad range of values for the underlying price. In fact, there are numerical
examples of GEI involving European options failing to exist. Moreover,
such counter-examples to the existence of a GEI for economies with
European options are robust with respect to certain perturbations. 44 But,
fortunately, GEI typically will exist for European options. 145  GEI also
typically exist for derivatives with smooth, nonlinear payoff functions, such
as those for American options.
146
IV. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
What are we to make of the above recent normative theoretical results
about generic normative indeterminacy of financial innovation and generic
constrained inefficiency of GEI? One reaction is that it is not really
surprising that derivative innovation is not always Pareto-improving. After
all, the introduction of any derivative will involve both winners and losers
because derivatives are zero-sum transactions between the counter-parties
involved. In addition, there are commissions, the fees of financial advisors,
and transaction costs that are involved in derivative trades. But, such a
partial equilibrium analysis of the parties directly involved in any particular
derivative transaction fails to appreciate the insight provided by a truly GE
analysis of derivative innovation. The point of GE analysis in the language
of contract law is that there are third-party effects on those not involved in
any particular derivative transaction. These pecuniary externalities involve
changes in the wealth of others resulting from changes in asset and spot
143. The difference between a European option and an American option is that one can only
exercise a European option on the date of its expiration, while one can exercise an American option
anytime before and on the date of its expiration.
144. See generally Heraklis Polemarchakis & Bon-l Ku, Options and Equilibrium, 19 J.
MATHEMATICAL ECON. 107 (1990) (providing a counter-example to existence of a GEI involving
European options that is robust in exogenous strike prices).
145. See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Market Equilibrium with Endogenous Price Uncertainty
and Options, in MARKETS, INFORMATION, AND UNCERTAINTY: ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC THEORY IN
HONOR OF KENNETH J. ARROW 97, 112 (Graciela Chichilnisky ed., 1999) (explaining how and why
there is generic existence of GEI when strike prices are not fixed, but instead set endogenously at-the-
money).
146. See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Competitive Equilibrium of Incomplete Markets for
Securities with Smooth Payoffs, 23 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 219,226,228 (1994).
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commodity market prices caused by a new asset and changes in the optimal
portfolio asset holdings in response to such price changes in asset and spot
commodity markets. It is important to note that after changes in the prices
of other assets besides the new derivative transaction, both counter-parties
in that derivative transaction might be worse off in terms of their overall
utility from their entire portfolio of asset holdings. In other words,
everybody, including each party to a new derivative innovation, is affected
not only by the wealth effects of that particular derivative transaction, but
also by the changes in asset portfolio holdings in response to changes in the
prices of other assets besides the new derivative in question. That
conclusion is the whole point of the generic normative indeterminacy
theoretical results. There is just a priori no guarantee that such feedback
and spillover effects will not occur if the counter-parties own at least some
other marketed asset. It is highly likely that counter-parties to a new
derivative transaction will each own at least another marketed asset, if they
are well-diversified.
Asking for Pareto-improvements might be demanding too much.
Instead, a regulator might strive to implement Kaldor-Hicks improvements,
otherwise known as potential Pareto-improvements in which there are
losers and winners, but with the winners being able to theoretically
compensate the losers and still remain better off.147 But, there are well-
known problems with Kaldor-Hicks improvements, not the least of which
is that the potential compensation payments are not actually required to be
made. Consistency of the Kaldor-Hicks improvement test requires constant
relative prices or that all consumers be alike in having quite restrictive
preferences.' 48 It is also likely that government regulators lack the detailed
information required to perform timely cost-benefit analysis of asset
innovations. Finally, the recent theoretical finance literature on GEI has
focused on Pareto-improvements and its variants or the lack thereof, not on
Kaldor-Hicks improvements.
Another reaction to the generic normative indeterminacy of derivative
innovation is to question whether the precise mathematical characterization
of genericity in these results is economically, financially, or legally
appropriate. In other words, while asset innovation is normatively
147. For the original definition and formulation of the Kaldor-Hicks welfare criterion, see John R.
Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696,711 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare
Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939).
148. See Allan M. Feldman, Kaldor-Hicks Compensation, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note
61, at 417, 420 (discussing how Kaldor-Hicks improvements are fundamentally disappointing from the
perspective of an economic theorist).
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indeterminate for most economies, how relevant are the notions of typical
and/or rare and accidental that are used in these results? An example of the
difficulty of interpreting the concept of genericity is provided by the fact
that every real-world GE involves a boundary allocation because most
consumers neither buy nor sell most commodities. But, the set of boundary
allocations is a closed set of measure zero, that is, boundary allocations
form a non-generic set. Another way of stating this last observation is that
most or typical allocations are not boundary ones. Thus, while generic
results hold for almost every theoretical economy, they might not apply to
any particular actual economy. Fortunately, these results hold for several
different notions of what is typical. But, it is unclear which are the most
appropriate notions.
A final reaction to the generic normative indeterminacy of derivative
innovation is that "one should not interpret the results of Elul's study as
suggesting that some innovations are good and others are bad."
149 Elul
explicitly cautioned that his work does not "suggest that it would be easy,
or even possible, for a government to introduce the 'right' kinds of assets-
the informational burdens in trying to do so would be extreme."' 150 He also
cautioned that his work does not "suggest that financial innovation is
always good or bad-one would be hard-pressed to find a real-world
example of either phenomenon, though clearly some innovations seem to
confer greater benefit upon society than others." 151 He concluded by
stating that his research intended to "suggest that greater sophistication, and
perhaps greater oversight, is needed in dealing with this problem, both from
a theoretical and from a practical point of view." 152 This part of the Article
considers the potential for greater oversight (and greater sophistication) by
regulatory agencies towards new derivatives.
A. APPROVAL OF NEW OTC DERIVATIVES
Although the results of Part III.A do not mean that a new derivative
market will necessarily reduce societal welfare, they do suggest proceeding
carefully in approving new derivatives. Such prudence contrasts with the
underlying philosophy of the SEC's regulatory policy of permitting any
corporation to issue securities, provided that it complies fully with the
mandatory disclosure requirements about its financial health. Such caution
is more consistent with the merit review that the CEA authorizes the CFTC
149. MOLYNEUX & SHAMROUKH, supra note 10, at 74.
150. I
151. Id.
152. Elul, supra note 126, at 73.
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to conduct to verify that trading in a new futures contract is not contrary to
the public interest. 153 As noted, "[b]ased on the legislative history of the
CEA, the CFTC has construed the public interest test as requiring a
showing by the exchange seeking designation as a contract market that the
contract can be expected to be used by commercial entities for price basing
and hedging cash market activities."' 154 The Office of Analysis in the
Division of Economics and Education at the CFTC has primary
responsibility for reviewing new futures contract applications. 55 Since
1975, such reviews are based on CFrC Guideline No. 1, which requires an
explanation of how the proposed futures contract would satisfy an
economic purpose and an analysis of individual contractual terms and
conditions.156 This guideline was streamlined in 1982 by relaxing the
requirement that a petitioning exchange had to affirmatively demonstrate
an economic purpose for a proposed contract and justify its terms
individually. 157 A newly proposed contract will satisfy the weak economic
purpose test of the revised Guideline No. 1 fairly easily. 58 This economic
purpose test and the analysis of the individual terms of the proposed
contract are the closest real-world inquiry to studying the impact of
introducing a futures contract on underlying spot market prices.
Recently, however, the CF1TC significantly reduced even further its
regulatory oversight over new futures contracts by approving final rules
that allow a futures exchange to list new contracts for trading without prior
approval from the CFrC. An exchange can then amend such contracts
pursuant to exchange certification. This new listing procedure is in
addition to already existing so-called fast-track procedures. 5 9 In addition
to discontinuing its ex ante new contract approval process, the CFTC is
seeking public comments on a proposal to revise CFTC regulation 1.41 to
permit a futures exchange to promulgate new exchange rules and amend
existing ones without prior CFTC approval. 160 Both of these recent actions
suggest that the CFrc is beginning a deregulatory phase at least for the
153. See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
154. GREENE, E AL., supra note 73, at 13-47 n.151.
155. See, e.g., Ronald W. Anderson, The Regulation of Futures Contract Innovations in the
United States, 4 J. FuTURES MARKETS 297, 299 (1984).
156. See Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,041 (May 13, 1975), reprinted in Anderson, supra note
155, at 327-31.
157. Economic and Public Interest Requirements for Contract Market Designation, 57 Fed. Reg.
3518, 3523 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 5).
158. See Anderson, supra note 155, at 300-01.
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foreseeable future. Current CFTC Chairman William Rainer has indicated
the above actions are part of an overall plan to move the CFTC from being
a frontline to an oversight regulator.'61
All of the above recent events at the cFrc indicate that it will no
longer conduct detailed cost-benefit analysis of new futures contracts, but
will rely instead on market forces to impose discipline on exchanges. This
means that we may come to live in a world in which the CFTC routinely
approves new futures contracts and waits to see if they attract interest. The
market system itself could lead to socially-useless futures contracts dying
out from a lack of trading volume. In fact, "[n]ew financial instruments
continue to proliferate, but most of them fail to trade successfully."'162 An
example of a derivative that failed to attract enough interest was a futures
contract written on diamonds. This derivative was introduced on the Los
Angeles Exchange in the early 1970s. It failed because diamond prices
were not sufficiently volatile, diamonds could not be packaged
homogeneously, and it had large bid-ask spreads. Another example of a
derivative that met with lukewarm interest was a futures contract whose
value derived from consumer or wholesale price indices. This derivative
may have failed because it was offered in a noninflationary period. But,
new derivatives can fail due to design flaws or so-called "political risk"
from adverse tax rulings by the Internal Revenue Service, unfavorable
judicial decisions, or hostile SEC accounting rulings.1
63
An evolutionary argument reasons that only socially-useful derivatives
can and will survive a market test. But this claim is problematic because
some of the people who can be harmed by a new derivative may not be
among those who trade in that new derivative due to general equilibrium
types of spillover effects from interdependencies between markets linked
by substitution and income effects of price changes. In other words, the
consequences of derivatives are not limited to just those who trade in a
particular derivative. Taxpayers in Orange County, California provide a
vivid example. Another possible example of the impact that asset
innovation can have upon seemingly unrelated markets is provided by
high-yield debt or so-called junk bonds. These financial instruments were
pioneered by Michael Milken to facilitate corporate takeovers that were
161. See William J. Reiner, Chairman Commodities Futures, Trading Commission, Remarks at
22d Annual Chicago-Kent College of Law Derivatives and Commodities Law Institute, Chicago,
Illinois (Oct. 28, 1999) <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/rainer-2.htm>.
162. Jack Clark Francis, Why Financial Instruments Fail or Succeed, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EQUITY DERIVATIVES, supra note 11, at 631.
163. Id. at 637-49.
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often followed by corporate restructuring that resulted in labor cutbacks in
particular sectors in our economy.1'6 4 An economist suggested
that one effect of trad[ing] in these unusually risky securities might have
been to make employment and the price of labor much more volatile,
even in industries not directly related to those actually issuing the bonds.
Because human capital is a good for which the incompleteness of
markets is quite prominent, this increased risk would have been borne by
those agents perhaps least able to diversify it.
165
Of course, that argument is unproven and not a complete GEI analysis
because one must determine whether displaced workers acquired new skills
and ever found higher paying jobs and whether economically depressed
regions ever regained their prosperity. In other words, a bona fide GEI
analysis must follow through all the possible multiplier effects of decreased
consumption spending as the result of corporate plant closings and
ultimately determine if social welfare rose or fell.
A full-scale general equilibrium analysis of the impact of a proposed
new derivative may be a daunting and unrealistic prospect for any
regulatory agency. But in reality, a regulatory body would only have to
study a proposed new derivative's impact on those assets that are
substitutes and complements as well as the underlying assets on which the
derivative is written. Such an inquiry may require simulations utilizing
computational general equilibrium models of a few related asset and
commodity markets, not an entire macroeconomic model.166 A recent
model provides a simple algorithm for computing GEI.167
Even if the CFTC decides in the future to examine new proposed
futures contracts utilizing computational general equilibrium analysis, the
CFTC might not have the information required to perform the requisite
analysis. More specifically, computational general equilibrium models
require inputs of consumers' utility functions and firms' production
functions. However, the CFTC or some other government agency can
164. See, e.g., Edmund Faltemayek, The Deal Decade: Verdict on the 80's, FORTUNE, Aug. 26,
1991, at 58; Terr Thomson, Cleaning Up Mike's Mess, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 15, 1990, at
85; Pamela Sherrid, Clemens P. Work & Robert F. Black, Debt on Trial, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP.,
Feb. 15, 1989, at 60 (describing the layoffs resulting from junk-bond financed takeovers).
165. Elul, supra note 126, at 44-45.
166. See generally HERBERT E. SCARF, COMPUTAT1ON OF ECONOMIC EQUIuBRIA (1973) (for an
exposition of computable GE models).
167. See Donald J. Brown, Peter M. DeMarzo & B. Curtis Eaves, Computing Equilibria when
Asset Markets Are Incomplete, 64 ECONOMETRICA 1, 19-25 (1996) (discusing computational
implementation of GEl models).
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obtain such information by collecting statistical data regarding the relevant
tastes and technology.
B. RETAIL CONSUMER DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS
Part III concluded that when asset markets are incomplete, market
forces do not assure that new OTC derivatives will always be socially
desirable. This conclusion holds despite the fact that OTC derivatives
markets involve corporate or institutional investors who are wealthy, if not
sophisticated, because those who might be harmed by new OTC derivatives
include people who do not trade them. In fact, the extent to which even
corporate or institutional investors understand OTC derivatives is
debatable. 168 This Section asks whether the above conclusion that new
OTC derivatives may not always be socially desirable also holds for
derivative product markets involving retail consumers that might be neither
wealthy nor sophisticated. Not surprisingly, the answer is yes.
The demographics of the baby-boomer generation approaching
retirement age strains many current public retirement income programs all
over the world, especially the pay-as-you-go Social Security program in the
United States. Countries such as Argentina, Australia, Chile, and Mexico
are or have replaced their national retirement programs with what are
known as self-directed Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs). Even
employers in the U.S. and the U.K. are shifting away from defined-benefit
plans, where the sponsor of the pension plan guarantees a certain level of
retirement income benefits, to PRAs, where the employees are free to make
their own choices from a menu of investments. 169 But with such freedom
comes the price of bearing all the investment risk of the level of returns
upon retirement. Employees could manage that risk with the help of a new
proposed class of financially engineered products called Guaranteed
Retirement Income Contracts (GRICs) that protect against inflation and
stock market risk.
170
168. See PARTNOY, supra note 67, at 57, 60 (describing how many buyers of Principal Exchange
Rate Linked Security (PERLS) "had no idea" what they were doing and "obviously did not understand"
them). But see Macey, supra note 67, at 1490-92 (arguing that corporate and institutional clients could
not be so clueless).
169. See Zvi Bodie, Investment Management and Technology: Past, Present, and Future, in THE
EFFECr OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE FINANCIAL SECrOR (forthcoming 1999).
170. See Zvi Bodie & Dwight B. Crane, The Design and Production of New Retirement Savings
Products, L PORTFOUO MOMT., Winter 1999, at 77, 78 (discussing such products in detail and
explaining how financial engineering techniques can price and synthesize them).
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Even outside the particular context of insuring against retirement
income risks, we may soon live in a world offering many retail consumer
derivative products.' 71 The menu of possible choices includes mortgage
rate swaps at your ATM or via the Internet, 172 S&P Indexed Certificates of
Deposit, 173 principal-protected S&P 500 funds, 174 and supershares in
superfunds. 175 The current low level of retail swap activity probably results
from a combination of legal and regulatory uncertainty as well as consumer
unfamiliarity with swaps. 176 All three factors are changing in the direction
of supporting a dramatic growth in retail swaps. In its report on OTC
derivatives and the CEA, The President's Working Group on Financial
Markets stated that specific recommendations concerning the regulation of
exchange-traded futures went beyond the scope of that report. 17 7 But it did
state that any regulation of exchange-traded futures must serve valid public
policy goals. 178 If the public policy goal of promoting efficiency includes
allocational efficiency of risk, then some form of active monitoring of new
retail consumer derivative products is in order. If the public policy goal of
promoting efficiency means informational efficiency rather than risk-
allocational efficiency, there is no guarantee that market or government
regulatory forces would keep off the market those retail consumer
derivative products that lower societal welfare. In either case, the concerns
that arise in the context of OTC derivatives carry over to the setting of
retail consumer derivative products.
V. OTHER REGULATORY PROPOSALS
Part IV only considered implications of the normative results in Part
HI for government regulators as gatekeepers determining if new derivatives
should be permitted on "wholesale" OTC markets or retail consumer
markets. But many other possible forms of regulation exist. For example,
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974179 amended the
CEA to create a pervasive regulatory framework applying to commodity
171. See Carolyn H. Jackson, Note, Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable Advent of Consumer
Derivatives, 67 FORDHAM. L. REv. 3205, 3207 (1999) (arguing that such a world is right around the
comer).
172. See id. at 3205, 3232.
173. See id. at 3222.
174. See id. at 3233.
175. See Mark Rubinstein, Supershares, in THE HANDBOOK OF EQUrrY DEIUVATVms, supra note
11, at 404,412-13.
176. See Jackson, supra note 171, at 3206.
177. See THE PRESIDENT's WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 62, at 21-23.
178. See id. at 22.
179. See 7 U.S.C. § 4 (a) (1994).
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trading advisors (CTAs)18 0 and commodity pool operators (CPOs) l8
involving antifraud prohibitions, 18 2 bookkeeping and other record-keeping
requirements,183 registration, 184 registration procedure, 85 and reporting
requirements. 16 The CFTC has also promulgated regulations under the
authority of the CEA that heavily regulate trading practices on futures
exchanges.'8 7 Finally, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that
all brokers188 and dealers'8 9 that want to trade on the OTC market be
members of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(NASD).190 In turn, the NASD requires that broker-dealers recommend
only "suitable" investments 91 and must have an adequate basis for making
a recommendation. 92 This part of the Article considers two novel
regulatory proposals for governmental intervention to improve the
allocation of risk in a society.
A. REALLOCATING EXISTING ASSETS
The specific numerical example in the Appendix makes it clear that
attaining Pareto-improvements requires that regulators have information
about individuals' preferences that most regulators are unlikely to have or
attain from market demand information. As the authors of the result that
GEI are typically constrained Pareto-inefficient conclude:
Whether it is generically possible to effect a Pareto-improving portfolio
reallocation when knowledge of investors' preferences is limited to
market demand functions is an open question.
To be sure, in order to effect a Pareto-improving reallocation of assets,
the government must be able to forecast all the resulting adjustments in
spot market prices and their effects on individual's utilities. This is an
enormous information burden, which it may be argued the government
cannot carry. But such an argument against market intervention, based
on the presumed ignorance of the government, is radically different from
180. See Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § la(5)(A) (1994) (defining CTA).
181. See Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § la(4)) (1994) (defining CPO).
182. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4o, 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1994).
183. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4n(3), 7 U.S.C. § 6n(3) (1994).
184. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4m, 7 U.S.C. § 6m (1994).
185. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4n(1), 7 U.S.C. §§ 6n(1), (2) (1994).
186. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4n(4), 7 U.S.C. § 6n(4) (1994).
187. See CFTC Reg 1.38, 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (2000) (requiring open and competitive outcry).
188. See Commodity Exchange Act § 3a(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(4) (2000) (defining a broker).
189. Dealers are defined by Exchange Act § 3a(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(5) (2000).
190. See Exchange Act § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (b)(8) (2000).
191. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art III, § 2.
192. See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589,597 (2d Cir. 1969).
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the standard argument for Pareto optimality that does not rely on any
lack of information.
193
Although the numerical example in the Appendix only holds for a
particular set of preferences and initial endowments, other work suggests
that constrained Pareto-inefficiency is more widespread.1 94 The important
contribution of GEI models is to provide an analytical apparatus and formal
techniques for proving the prevalence of the phenomena of constrained
Pareto-inefficiency. The intuition for this general result that GEI are
constrained Pareto-inefficient is aptly summarized by its authors:
An asset reallocation in any economy has two effects on an individual's
utility-a direct effect from the income transfer and an indirect effect
due to the relative price change in commodity spot markets. When
markets are complete, the income reallocation caused by the price
change can be decomposed into a combination of assets that have
already been priced by the market. When the asset market is incomplete,
it is generically the case that the price changes will cause an income
redistribution that market itself could not directly implement. In essence,
the central planner has access to a wider class of assets than those
directly traded.195
A later paper by the same authors demonstrated that a benevolent
regulator might not be able to deduce individuals' tastes and initial
endowments from their observable market behavior so as to implement a
Pareto-improving reallocation of investors' asset portfolios.
196
But a less restrictive informational scenario, other than being able to
deduce or observe the individual characteristics of tastes and initial
endowments, is that a benevolent regulator can obtain statistical
information about such individual characteristics. In this more plausible
case, a benevolent regulator is unable to discern an investor's type, defined
to be his particular utility function and initial endowment. Thus, any
proposed reallocation of asset portfolios has to be a rule specifying a
particular asset portfolio for a reported investor's type. In other words, any
193. Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis, supra note 133, at 94.
194. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium, 49 REV.
ECON. STUD. 241 (1982); David M. Newbery & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Choice of Technique and the
Optimality of Equilibrium with Rational Expectations, 90 J. POL. ECON. 223 (1982) (providing
examples of constrained Pareto-inefficiency for competitive market equilibrium allocations in particular
models).
195. Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis, supra note 133, at 69.
196. See John D. Geanakoplos & Heraklis M. Polemarchakis, Observability and Optimality, 19 J.
MATHEMATICAL ECON. 153, 154, 162, 165 (1990) (formally proving that even a benevolent central
planner may be unable to determine Pareto-improving portfolio reallocations from the observed market
behavior of individuals).
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reallocation by a benevolent regulator who is unable to verify an
individual's type must be designed so that each individual finds it in his
best interest to truthfully report his type. A particular reallocation of asset
portfolios is defined to be anonymous if each individual prefers to receive
the asset portfolio assigned to his type over that assigned to any other
type.197 A GEI is defined to be anonymous constrained optimal if there is
no anonymous reallocation of asset portfolios resulting in a Pareto-
improvement.
A natural question is whether a GEI can be anonymous constrained
optimal. The answer depends on when a benevolent regulator intervenes
and whether investors anticipate perfectly that intervention. If a benevolent
regulator intervenes before asset markets open and is able to prevent any
asset trading after intervening, then for generic utility functions and initial
endowments, a GEI is not anonymous constrained optimal. 198 But if a
benevolent regulator intervenes before asset markets open and investors
can trade assets after that intervention, then for generic initial endowments,
a GEI is anonymous constrained optimal. 199 Finally, if a benevolent
regulator intervenes after investors finish trading assets and investors can
anticipate perfectly that intervention, then any GEI that is not Pareto-
dominated by another GEI is anonymous constrained optimal."00
B. REGULATING UNDERLYING SPOT MARKET PRICES
A final policy reaction to ambiguous normative results about new
assets or government reallocating asset portfolios is to consider government
regulation of underlying spot commodity market prices. Familiar examples
of price regulation are fixed or pegged currency exchange rates, interest
rate ceilings for credit cards or consumer loans, minimum wage legislation,
price supports for agricultural products, and rent controls. The first type of
price regulation was made in the name of stability while the other forms of
price regulation are usually proposed and implemented on the basis of
improving equity. Of course, regulating spot commodity market prices to
take on values that are different from their market equilibrium values
means there will have to be rationing to clear markets that otherwise will
not balance demand and supply.
197. See Atsushi Kajii, Anonymity and Optimality of Competitive Equilibria when Markets Are
Incomplete, 64 J. ECON. THEORY 115, 116 (1994) (defining the requirement of anonymity and
explaining its importance when investors are heterogeneous).
198. See id. at 124.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 125.
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A theoretical concept known as fix-price equilibrium describes the
allocation of resources when prices can take on arbitrary (that is,
nonmarket clearing) values.20I This notion extends to an economy with
incomplete asset markets.2 "2 Price regulation is said to Pareto-improve
upon a competitive equilibrium if there is a set of spot commodity market
prices such that a new fix-price equilibrium commodity allocation at the
new spot commodity market prices and the original competitive
equilibrium's asset prices Pareto-dominates the competitive equilibrium's
commodity allocation.203 If there are sufficiently many states of the world
or commodities, then Pareto-improving price regulation is generically
possible.2" If there are sufficiently many commodities, the deviation of
prices from their competitive market equilibrium values can be selected
before knowing the state of the world.205
Such price regulation has several advantages over asset portfolio
reallocation. First, it involves only aggregate market variables, namely
spot commodity market prices. Second, it is an anonymous intervention so
there is no household specific information required for achieving it. In
both asset markets and spot commodity markets, the volume of trade is
determined endogenously. But such price regulation still places severe
informational demands on a regulator to know the marginal utilities of
income and excess demands for spot commodities across states to




This Article considered the normative implications of derivative
innovations by drawing on the recent literature about general equilibrium
models of incomplete asset markets. In particular, there are several perhaps
unexpected regulatory policy implications when competitive asset markets
are incomplete. First, if, as is likely true, asset markets are sufficiently
incomplete, the normative consequences of introducing nonredundant
201. See generally Jacques H. Dreze, Existence of an Exchange Equilibrium Under Price
Rigidities, 16 INT'LECON. REV. 301 (1975) (defining and proving existence of fix-price equilibria).
202. See P. J. J. HERINGS & HERAKIS POLEMARCIiAKIS, PARETO IMPROVING PRICE
REGULATION WHEN THE ASSET MARKET Is INCOMPLETm 1, 6-7 (Tilburg Univ. Center for Econ. Res.
Discussion Paper No. 9930, Mar. 1999) (extending fix-price equilibrium definition to economies with
incomplete asset markets).
203. See id. at 28.
204. See id. at 31.
205. See id. at 35.
206. See id. at 41.
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derivatives are typically ambiguous. In other words, there is a sharp
discontinuity between economies with more than one asset missing and
those with just one asset missing because in the former introducing a
derivative has ambiguous normative consequences while in the latter,
introducing a derivative that completes asset markets unambiguously
increases all consumers' utilities. Second, whether even a fictitious
benevolent government regulator can improve upon the allocation of risk
that corresponds to a competitive general equilibrium of incomplete asset
markets depends on three factors. These factors are the level of
information that regulators have about consumers, the timing of regulation,
and the anticipation by investors of regulation. Both of these normative
results contrast sharply with a world in which asset markets are complete.
In a complete asset markets world, the resulting equilibrium allocation is
ensured to be Pareto-efficient so that there is no scope for derivative
innovation or government regulation to improve the well-being of
households.
Of course, the above results also assumed symmetric information
among participants in asset markets. Many of the recent well-publicized
problems involving derivatives were the result of breaches of fiduciary
duties, outright fraud, or asymmetric information2°7-- hence, the proposals
for improving disclosure about derivatives and greater transparency
regarding positions of derivatives that are not traded on exchanges (where
disclosure and transparency are less problematic). But some commentators
believe that such proposals may do more damage than good.208 Even in the
absence of deception or manipulation, the mere fact that asset markets are
incomplete could lead to investors overreacting to news or events (because
they are unable to hedge all conceivable risks) and thus a breakdown of the
informationally efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH). The ECMH
is the foundation of much corporate and securities law.209  Legal
academics, judges, lawyers, and law students may come to realize, as most
current financial academics and professionals do, that it is high time to
207. See Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 204, 205 (1999) (discussing the lack of information on the part
of Long-Term Capital Management's creditors and counter-parties about Long-Term Capital
Management's borrowings, derivatives positions, and trading strategies).
208. See, e.g., DON M. CHANCE, Accounting for Derivatives, in ESSAYS IN DERIVATIvES 289,
289-93 (1998); DON M. CHANCE, Derivatives Disclosure, in ESSAYS IN DERIVATIvES 294, 294-97
(1998) (arguing that a perfect accounting or disclosure regime is an impossibility); MCLAUGHLiN,
supra note 8, at 494-99.
209. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
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move past the finance of the 1960s that assumed ECM I.210 One impetus
for such a move is a set of experimental findings from behavioral and
cognitive psychology. 211 But the meaning and interpretation of some of
these findings is disputed.212 Additionally, there are difficulties in
developing theoretical underpinnings for and policy implications of such
findings.213 This Article illustrates how the recent GEl literature about
incomplete asset markets provides a coherent theoretical catalyst for a
rethinking of regulatory policy regarding asset markets.
Merton H. Miller concluded his 1990 Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economics lecture by proclaiming that "the focus in finance has not been
on issues of public policy .... Now that [finance] has officially come of
age, [it is time] ... to bring... the public policy insights, to the attention of
a wider audience."214 This Article has taken a step along that journey by
tracing through three central regulatory implications of incomplete asset
markets analysis. More generally, this Article suggests that recent
theoretical research on allocating risk in an efficient manner does not
necessarily support a laissez-faire regulatory stance towards derivative
innovations. On the other hand, specific numerical examples offer support
for the proposition that, empirically, the gains to a particular derivative
innovation can be quite significant.215  Because a government regulator
might be less than benevolent or be informationally challenged, it is
important not to make "the Nirvana fallacy, under which any discrepancy
between the real and the ideal is viewed as proof that the real is
210. See generally, e.g., ROBERT A. HAUGEN, THE NEW FINANCE: THE CASE AGAINST EFFICIENT
MARKETS (2d ed. 1999) (asserting that investors and corporations face inefficient and over-reactive
capital markets, thus requiring the revision of many long-accepted principles of corporate finance).
211. For a discussion on how heurestic-driven cognitive biases and frame dependence can lead
stock prices to deviate from their fundamental values for very long periods, see BELSKY & GILOVICH,
supra note 79, at 33-42.
212. See Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond "Heuristics and
Biases". 2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 83, 86-101 (1991) (arguing that many so-called cognitive biases
do not actually violate probability theory); Gerd Gigerenzer, On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics:
A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 592, 592-95 (1996) (arguing that certain
heurestics explain too little and too much).
213. See Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (1998) (discussing the lack of a coherent model for behavioral law and
economics).
214. Merton H. Miller, Leverage, 46 J. FIN. 479,488 (1991).
215. See David M. Newberry, Missing Markets: Consequences and Remedies, in THE ECONOMICS
OF MISSING MARKETS, INFORMATION, AND GAMES 211, 231-38 (Frank Hahn ed., 1989); DAVID M.
NEWBERRY & JOSEPH E. STIGLrIZ, THE THEORY OF COMMODITY PRICE STABILIZATION 187, 291
(1981).
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inefficient."216 In the real world, regulators may be politically unwilling or
myopically motivated not to determine ex ante whether a particular
derivative innovation will raise societal welfare.217 An economic theory of
regulation teaches us that regulation often benefits members of the industry
being regulated.21 For example, prohibitions against insider trading can
end up benefiting securities market professionals.
219
A pro-regulatory position that supports the government reallocating
portfolios of existing assets via taxation and redistribution policies would
require that there are sizeable inefficiencies from existing GEL This is an
empirical question that will involve a very fact-specific inquiry depending
upon the precise assets that are missing and the exact values of the
parameters describing an economy. For example, farmers adopting an
inefficient choice of production technique resulted in an extremely small
welfare loss of less than one-sixth of one percent.220
A government regulator can also make all households better off by
introducing new public or government-backed assets or by standardizing
privately-created assets.221  While reputational bonding devices can
mitigate fraud or agent myopia, they cannot guarantee that a new asset or
derivative will necessarily improve societal welfare. Organizational norms
and institutional cultures affect not only how efficient, but also how
equitable market outcomes are. Wall Street norms that accept, if not even
reward, certain types of greedy behavior partially explain the continuing
and numerous instances of rogue trading.222 The norms of behavior or
institutional cultures of brokers, dealers, exchanges, investment banks,
markets, and even regulatory agencies can affect how much material fraud
216. Daniel R. Fischel & Sanford J. Grossman, Customer Protection in Futures and Securities
Markets, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETs 273, 281 (1984) (defining Nirvana fallacy).
217. See generally Christopher Colburn & Peter Locke, Derivatives Regulation: Efficiency versus
Public Choice Perspectives (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
218. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MG T. Scl. 3 (1971); Samuel Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 BELL J.
ECON. & MGhm. Sc. 211 (1976).
219. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest
Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311, 313 (1987).
220. See Newberry, supra note 215, at 230-31. See generally David M. Newberry & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, The Choice of Techniques and the Optimality of Market Equilibrium with Rational
Expectations, 90 J. POL. ECON. 223-46 (1982).
221. For a description of each of these regulatory options, see ALLEN & GALE, supra note 13, at
271-307,309-45.
222. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Norms, Psychology and the "Rogue
Trader", U. OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (explaining how individual traders' psychology and or
institutional norms account for greed and persistent rogue trades).
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occurs and what time horizons asset market participants adopt.223 Fairness
or equity-based norms of behavior and organizational cultures may even
prevent the introduction of new derivatives that will lower societal welfare
because the design and marketing of derivatives often exploit behavioral
aspects of human decisionmaking. 22 4 But, without strong enough norms or
cultures, such behavioral realities provide another impetus for the
regulation of derivative innovations and markets.
225
In conclusion, although new financially-engineered derivatives can
shift financial risks, "[t]hey have also often fostered the illusion of a safe
haven offering seemingly unlimited investment returns with virtually no
risk" and "[g]iven human nature, many investors are probably unable to
resist the allure of strategies that promise both increased returns and
reduced risk.' 226 But, the incompleteness of asset markets implies that
market participants can not hedge fully or insure against or speculate upon
some financial risks. In other words, there will always be some degree of
residual financial risks in an economy. But, as is the case with nonfinancial
risks, financial risks might not always be undesirable. It is only human
nature to believe in and hope for technological progress to improve social
welfare. A principal moral of this Article is that for most economies,
financial technological progress in the form of new derivatives created by
financial engineering might not improve societal welfare if asset markets
are sufficiently incomplete.
223. See generally MITCHEL Y. ABOLAFIA, MAKING MARKETS: OPPORTUNISM AND RESTRAINT
ON WALL STREET (1996) (providing a fascinating ethnography of three Wall Street subcultures: the
markets for bonds, futures, and stocks).
224. See, e.g., SHEFRIN, supra note 79, at 273 (discussing behavioral aspects in option markets) &
289 (discussing behavioral aspects in orange juice concentrate futures markets); Hersh Shefrin & Meir
Statman, Behavioral Aspects of the Design and Marketing of Financial Products, 22 FIN. MOMT. 123
(1993) (proposing a behaviorally based model of asset design and promotion).
225. See Hersh Shefin & Meir Statman, Ethics, Fairness and Efficiency in Financial Markets, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 21-23 (discussing alternative rationales for prohibiting insider
trading).
226. JACOBS, supra note 139, at 300.
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APPENDIX:
AN EXAMPLE OF A REGULATOR IMPROVING RISK
ALLOCATION BY REALLOCATING A DERIVATIVE
This appendix provides a specific numerical example of a competitive
market economy in which a government regulator implements a Pareto-
improvement from a GEI by reallocating an existing derivative without
completing asset markets. The results discussed in Part lII.B of the Article
demonstrate that the phenomenon illustrated by this example holds more
generally.
Consider an economy with the following structure. There are three
consumers: Alpha, Beta, and Delta; two commodities: gold and oil; and
two states of the world: one and two. Denote by J and o. the respective
consumption of gold and oil by consumer j in state of the world s, where j
= A (Alpha), B (Beta), or D (Delta) and s = 1 or 2. Alpha's utility function
is given by this formula: gA + k min g , o}, where k is a fixed constant;
Beta's utility function is given by this formula: gB,+ k min {gB, oB}, with k
again being the same fixed constant; and Delta's utility function is given by
this formula: oDI+ oD2.
Alpha's utility function means that Alpha consumes only gold in state
one and that Alpha always consumes an equal number of units of gold and
oil in state two. The functional form of Alpha's utility means that for each
bundle of gold and oil that Alpha consumes in state two, Alpha is willing to
forgo k units of gold in state one. Beta's utility function means that in state
one Beta always consumes an equal number of units of gold and oil, and in
state two Beta consumes only gold. The functional form of Beta's utility
means that for each bundle of gold and oil that Beta consumes in state one,
Beta is willing to forgo k units of gold in state two. Delta's utility function
means that Delta will consume only oil. The functional form of Delta's
utility function means that Delta's marginal rate of substitution between
consumption of oil in states one and two is unity.
Assume that initially Alpha has no units of gold and two units of oil in
state one as well as two units of gold and no units of oil in state two.
Furthermore, assume that Beta initially has two units of gold and no units
of oil in state one as well as no units of gold and two units of oil in state
two. Finally, assume that Delta initially has one unit of gold and one unit
of oil in both states of the world. So, in this economy, there is an aggregate
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initial endowment of three units of gold and three units of oil in each state
of the world.
The asset structure of this economy is extremely simple. There is just
one derivative asset, namely a forward contract written on gold, that
delivers one unit of gold in each state of the world. The initial commodity
endowments of consumers in each state completely determine spot
commodity prices in each state and the resulting equilibrium levels of
income because the single derivative asset market of this economy is not
active.
In a competitive equilibrium, the spot commodity relative price ratio is
one in both states of the world. Alpha consumes two units of gold and no
units of oil in state one, but just one unit of gold and one unit of oil in state
two. Beta consumes two units of gold and no units of oil in state two, but
just one unit of gold and one unit of oil in state one. Delta consumes two
units of oil in either state one or state two. Both Alpha and Beta enjoy an
expected utility level of two plus k, while Delta enjoys an expected utility
level of four.
Although the derivative asset market involves no active trading
because there is just one derivative asset, a benevolent and knowledgeable
regulator could utilize that single derivative asset to redistribute income
across the states and hence change spot commodity prices. For example,
assume that our benevolent and knowledgeable regulator directs that Alpha
and Beta each supply Delta with two units of the one derivative asset.
Because the one derivative asset is a forward contract that delivers one unit
of gold in each state of the world, such a requirement is equivalent to
changing initial commodity endowments as follows.
Alpha initially has negative two units of gold (that is, owes gold to
Delta) and two units of oil in state one, but has nothing in state two. Beta
initially has nothing in state one, but has negative two units of gold (again,
owes gold to Delta) and two units of oil in state two. Delta initially has
five units of gold and one unit of oil regardless of the state of the world.
For this economy with these modified initial endowments, the new
equilibrium price ratio of gold in terms of oil is two and one-half in each
state of the world. Alpha consumes all three units of gold and no units of
oil in state one, but nothing in state two. Beta consumes nothing in state
one, but all three units of gold and no oil in state two. Delta consumes all
three units of oil in either state of the world. Both Alpha and Beta enjoy an
expected utility level of three, while Delta enjoys an expected utility level
of six.
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Comparing consumers' expected utilities before and after the regulator
mandated reallocation of the one derivative asset reveals that for all values
of k satisfying 0 < k < 1, everybody is better off after than before the
regulator reallocated the one derivative asset. In other words, the new
equilibrium spot commodity market allocation Pareto-dominates the old
equilibrium spot commodity market allocation. The reason for this result is
that transferring income to Delta in both states of the world lowered the
price of the gold demanded by Alpha and Beta in those states where they
valued their increased utility the most.
If this economy had a complete set of asset markets, then consumers
could have attained the above Pareto-superior equilibrium spot commodity
market allocation themselves by trading on the set of complete asset
markets without any government intervention or income transfers. The
above Pareto-superior spot commodity market allocation provides the
commodity amounts that balance the demands and supplies in those
commodity markets if the spot price ratio of gold in terms of oil is one-half
in each state of the world. In other words, the above Pareto-superior spot
commodity market allocation is the quantity part of a GEI if the relative
commodity market price ratio is one across the states of the world.
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